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The point of proper accommodation between the meting
out of justice and the performance of military
operations—which involved not only the fighting, but
also the winning of wars—is one which no one has
discovered. I do not know of any expert on the subject—
military or civilian—who can be said to have the perfect
solution.1
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I. Introduction
Nearly three million servicemembers are subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a comprehensive statutory framework
for investigating and prosecuting the offenses it defines. The UCMJ was
enacted in 1950 as a response to concerns about the existing Articles of
War.2 In enacting the UCMJ, Congress struggled to balance the need for
the commander to maintain discipline within the ranks against the belief
that the military justice system could be made fairer, to protect the rights
of servicemembers against the arbitrary actions of commanders. The
final product could be considered a compromise.
The UCMJ replaced the Articles of War, which had governed
military justice since 1775. It was designed to provide a fair system of
procedures and substantive rules to oversee the administration of justice
in the ranks, to the end of promoting discipline. The commander
remained an integral part of the military justice structure. But the Code
expanded due process protections to servicemembers and created a threejudge civilian court to review court-martial convictions. Congress has
amended the UCMJ many times, sometimes to favor the prosecution of
offenses and at other times to expand the protections to the accused.3

1

Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 1, Wash. D.C., March 7, 1949 (Index
and Legislative History, Uniform Code of Military Justice 597 (1950)).
2
A number of commentators have written on the history and background of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). See, e.g., ROBINSON O. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1956); BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES
SNEDEKER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF COURTS-MARTIAL (1954); Walter T. Cox, The Army,
The Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1
(1987) (presenting an overview of development of military justice in the United States
and the applicability of the Constitution to various rules and practices); Major Gerald F.
Crump, Part II: A History of the Structure of Military Justice in the United States, 19211966, 17 A.F. L. REV. 55 (Fall 1975) (presenting brief overview of the military justice
developments from the period following World War I until the period preceding the
changes to the system in the 1968 changes to the UCMJ and the 1969 Manual for CourtsMartial (MCM)); Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953) (transcribing part of symposium on military justice,
presenting an overview of the 1950 UCMJ and proposals leading to its passage); David
A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 129 (1980).
3
See, e.g., Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968); Major Howard H. Hoege
III, “Overshift”: The Unconstitutional Double Burden Shift on Affirmative Defenses in
the New Article 120, ARMY LAW., May 2007, at 2, 4 (describing Congress’s effort to
reverse the burden of proof on consent in sexual assault cases).
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The military justice system has been described as a “rough form of
justice,”4 a system providing more rights than its civilian counterparts,5 a
system of “drumhead justice,”6 a system incapable of dispensing justice,7
an evolving system,8 a system that has been civilianized,9 a system in
need of modernization,10 and a system in search of respect.11 However
one describes or views the system, there has always been, and will
always be, a debate over the exact purpose and function of the military
justice system.
How one describes the system’s chief function may depend on what
themes or concepts take the fore. The poles—as they always have
been—are two: justice and discipline. These two values are often in
competition with each other.12 In that competition rests a conundrum that
is not easily answered or solved. How do you fit together the two
4

See United States v. Denedo, 556 U. S. 904, 918 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that traditionally military justice has been a rough form of justice).
5
See Lieutenant Homer E. Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused:
Advantages Over a Civilian Defendant, 22 ME. L. REV. 105 (1970), reprinted at 51 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (1971); Robert Poydasheff & William K. Suter, Military Justice? Definitely!,
49 TUL. L. REV. 588 (1975).
6
See, e.g., Robinson O. Everett, The New Look in Military Justice, 1973 DUKE L.J. 648
(1973) (responding to allegations of “drumhead justice” in the military).
7
See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
8
See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2; Andrew M. Ferris, Military Justice: Removing the
Probability of Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 440 (1994) (noting that like other
divisions of the government, the military justice system has evolved).
9
See, e.g., Delmar Karlen, Civilianization of Military Justice: Good or Bad, 60 MIL. L.
REV. 113 (1973) (arguing against blind application of civilian system to military justice);
Edward F. Sherman, Civilianization of Military Justice, 22 MAINE L. REV. 3 (1970)
(describing how system has been civilianized through the years).
10
See, e.g., Kevin J. Barry, Modernizing the Manual for Courts-Martial Rule-Making
Process: A Work in Progress, 165 MIL. L. REV. 237 (2000) (offering suggestions for
modernizing the procedures for amending the MCM; Gregory E. Maggs, Cautious
Skepticism About the Benefit of Adding More Formalities to the Manual for CourtsMartial Rule-Making Process: A Response to Captain Kevin J. Barry, 166 MIL. L. REV. 1
(2000); Kevin J. Barry, A Reply to Captain Gregory E. Maggs’s ‘Cautious Skepticism’
Regarding Recommendations to Modernize the Manual for Courts-Martial Rule-Making
Process, 166 MIL. L. REV. 37 (2000).
11
David A. Schlueter, Military Justice in the 1990s: A Legal System in Search of Respect,
133 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing features of military justice system that typically
draw criticism).
12
See, e.g., General William C. Westmoreland & General George S. Prugh, Judges in
Command: The Judicialized Uniform Code of Military Justice in Combat, 3 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1980) (“A second problem for military codes is to identify and adopt
those procedures which ensure fairness and ‘due process’ while preserving the ability of
the forces to achieve their mission. This brings into conflict the commander's
responsibility for mission accomplishment and the serviceman's rights.”).
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competing values of justice and discipline? Should one predominate? If
so, which one?
Historically, it was assumed that the primary purpose of military
justice was to enforce good order and discipline. The Articles of War, the
predecessor to the UCMJ,13 recognized the commander’s broad authority
to prosecute and punish any servicemember accused of an offense.
Punishment was generally swift and sure and was sometimes harsh or
arbitrary.14 The “justice” component—which in the early days of the
military justice system was much less than today’s system—required the
commander to provide basic due process while enforcing discipline.15
Over time, the system has evolved. In many ways its evolution has
reflected the expansion of individual rights in the civilian criminal justice
systems.16
The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) lists the purposes of
“military law” and places justice first:
3. Nature and purpose of military law.
Military law consists of the statutes governing the
military establishment and regulations issued thereunder,
the constitutional powers of the President and
regulations issued thereunder, and the inherent authority
of military commanders. Military law includes
jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial and the
jurisdiction exercised by commanders with respect to
nonjudicial punishment. The purpose of military law is
to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order
and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency
and effectiveness in the military establishment, and
thereby to strengthen the national security of the United
States.17
13
The Continental Congress enacted the original Articles of War in 1775. Through the
years they were amended until the UCMJ finally replaced them in 1950.
14
See United States v. McCarty, 29 C.M.R. 757, 760–61 (C.G.B.R. 1960) (noting
severity of punishments during World War II and that sometimes there would be
proposals to discipline court members for adjudging inadequate sentences); WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 567 (2d ed. 1920 Reprint).
15
Schlueter, supra note 2, at 145–50 (discussing protections for servicemembers subject
to court-martial).
16
Id. at 165 (noting due process developments reflecting extant views of justice).
17
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pmbl. (2012) [hereinafter MCM].
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Notwithstanding this language in the MCM, there is an ongoing
debate over the relationship between justice and discipline the military.
This article explores that debate.
Part II provides a brief summary of how the military justice system
works, as a prelude to identifying the elements of the debate. Part III
explores the various thematic approaches to the military justice
conundrum. Those themes are sometimes in competition and sometimes
complementary. They reflect the views of courts and commentators that
have addressed the conundrum. Part IV discusses an approach to the
conundrum by drawing from similar analyses of civilian criminal justice
systems, which recognize the debate over whether a criminal justice
system should reflect a crime control model or a due process model. Part
V attempts to resolve the conundrum using a “primary purpose” analysis
of the military justice system. Finally, Part VI offers some
recommendations for solving the conundrum.
II. Overview of the Military Justice System
Before addressing in more detail the debate over the relationship
between justice and discipline, it is important briefly to review how the
military justice system works.
A. Pretrial Procedures
The statutory framework for military justice is the UCMJ. Article 36
provides that the President may adopt procedures for the conduct of
courts-martial.18 Those procedures are spelled out in the MCM. In
addition, the Department of Defense, the service secretaries, and
commanders may promulgate regulations to provide additional guidance.
Courts-martial, which are only temporary tribunals,19 are created to
determine the guilt or innocence of persons accused of committing
offenses while subject to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces. Some

18
19

UCMJ art. 36 (2012).
McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 63 (1902).
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would argue that they are designed to enforce discipline and others, to
ensure that justice is done.20
Currently, a commander convenes a court-martial to hear a specific
case.21 It is not a part of the federal judiciary. However, the Supreme
Court of the United States may ultimately review a military conviction.22
In some points, the court-martial provides greater safeguards than its
civilian counterparts do. A brief survey of current practice demonstrates
this point.
Before swearing to and preferring court-martial charges, a
commander is responsible for conducting a thorough and impartial
inquiry into the charged offenses.23 This almost always involves
obtaining legal advice from a judge advocate.24 During that investigation,
an accused is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment vis-avis searches and seizures,25 the privilege against self-incrimination as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 of the UCMJ,26 and
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for example, at a pretrial lineup.
These constitutional protections are implemented not only by case law,
which has concluded that they extend to servicemembers, but by the
Military Rules of Evidence (MRE).27
20

See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
1-1 (8th ed. 2012).
21
See UCMJ arts. 22–24 (2012) (designating those with power to convene general,
special, and summary courts-martial); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 504 (providing
procedure for convening court-martial). The UCMJ provides that the President of the
United States and a Service Secretary may convene a general court-martial. UCMJ art.
24(a), (2012).
22
UCMJ art. 67(h) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012). See generally Andrew Effron,
Supreme Court of Review of Decisions by the Court of Military Appeals: The Legislative
Background, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1985, at 59 (reviewing the Military Justice Act, which
placed the Court of Military Appeals directly under the U.S. Supreme Court’s review);
Bennett Boskey & Eugene Grossman, The Supreme Court’s New Certiorari Jurisdiction
Over Military Appeals, 102 F.R.D. 329, 105 S. Ct. at XCII (1984) (discussing the
Military Justice Act and the resulting certiorari jurisdiction the Supreme Court has over
military appeals).
23
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1205.
24
UCMJ art. 37 (2012) (listing the requirement that before convening a general courtmartial the convening authority must consider the advice of the staff judge advocate).
This is generally referred to as the “pretrial advice.”
25
MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 311–21.
26
UCMJ art. 31 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 301–05.
27
See MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 301 (noting the privilege against selfincrimination); id. MIL. R. EVID. 304 (listing the procedures for determining admissibility
of accused’s statements); id. MIL. R. EVID. 305 (stating the Article 31(b) warnings and
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The commander has broad discretion in deciding how to dispose of
misconduct. First, the commander may decide that under the
circumstances simply counseling the servicemember or issuing a
reprimand is sufficient.28 Second, the commander may decide to begin
administrative proceedings to discharge the servicemember.29 Third, the
commander may decide to impose nonjudicial punishment. Under this
third option, which is intended to be used for “minor” offenses, the
commander decides whether the servicemember is guilty and, if so,
adjudges the punishment. Unless the servicemember is assigned to a
vessel,30 the servicemember may demand a court-martial in lieu of the
nonjudicial punishment.31 Finally, the commander may decide to initiate
court-martial proceedings by formally preferring charges against the
servicemember.32
If charges are preferred, commanders move them up the chain of
command for recommendations and actions. If the commander believes
that the charges are serious enough to warrant a general court-martial
(roughly equivalent to a civilian felony trial), the commander orders an
Article 32 investigation.33 At that investigation the accused is entitled to
be present, to have the assistance of counsel, to cross-examine witnesses,
and to have witnesses produced. Although the Article 32 investigation is

right to counsel warnings); id. MIL. R. EVID. 311–16 (enumerating the rules addressing
requirements for searches and seizures); and id. MIL. R. EVID. 321 (discussing the
admissibility of eyewitness identifications).
28
SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 1-8, at 6 (listing various options available to military
commander).
29
Id. § 1-8(B), at 6.
30
The term “vessel” is defined in 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). “The word ‘vessel’ includes every
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as
a means of transportation on water.”
31
See UCMJ art. 15 (2012) (setting out procedures for nonjudicial punishment).
32
Id. art. 30. Technically, any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges against
another; however, in current practice, the preferral is almost always done by the
servicemember’s immediate commander, and only a commander may actually send
charges to a court-martial. In the past, charges were apparently more often brought by an
accuser who was not the commander. See Bradley J. Nicholson, Courts-Martial in the
Legion Army: American Military Law in the Early Republic, 1792-1796, 144 MIL. L.
REV. 77, 103–04 (1994) (recounting a case in which each of two officers accused the
other of slights to his own honor, resulting in three courts-martial, to the consternation of
their commanding general); LOUISE BARNETT, UNGENTLEMANLY ACTS 53 (2000) (stating
that in the post-Civil War U.S. Army, filings of charges and countercharges were
common and absorbed a great deal of the time and energy of commanding officers).
33
UCMJ art. 32.
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often equated with a civilian grand jury, in many ways it is far more
protective of an accused’s rights than a grand jury.34
If the decision is made to refer the charges to a court-martial, the
convening authority—a commander authorized by the UCMJ to
“convene” a court-martial—selects the court members, but does not
select either the counsel or the military judge. Specific provisions in the
UCMJ prohibit a convening authority from unlawfully influencing the
participants in the court-martial or the outcome of the case.35 In many
cases, the accused and the convening authority engage in plea bargaining
and execute a pretrial agreement.36 Typically, those agreements require
the accused to plead guilty in return for a guaranteed maximum
sentence.37

34

SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 7 (discussing and analyzing features of Article 32
pretrial investigation).
35
See UCMJ art. 37 (2012) (prohibiting unlawful command influence). Unlawful
command influence is a perpetual threat to the military justice system and is the subject
of considerable case law and commentary. See generally Major Martha Huntley Bower,
Unlawful Command Influence: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 28 A.F. L. REV. 65
(1988) (discussing unlawful command influence); Anthony P. DeGiulio, Command
Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful Application, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 72 (1972)
(examining “the disciplinary policies established by command directives, the prohibition
against the accuser as convening authority, and the command control over court
personnel, counsel, military judges, and case review”); Major Larry A. Gaydos & Major
Michael Warren, What Commanders Need to Know About Unlawful Command Control,
ARMY LAW., Oct. 1986, at 9 (presenting a methodology to “teach commanders about
lawful and unlawful command and control”); Lieutenant James D. Harty, Unlawful
Command Influence and Modern Military Justice, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 231 (1986)
(discussing the corrective measures that must be taken when commanders “step over the
line and undermine [the] right to a fair trial”); Joseph Hely, Command Influence on
Military Justice, 15 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 300 (1970) (noting inherent tendency for command
influence); Lieutenant Richard C. Johnson, Unlawful Command Influence: A Question of
Balance, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. (NAVY) J. 87, 88 (Mar.–Apr. 1965) (considering
command control “and the problem arising therefrom”); Craig Schwender, Who’s Afraid
of Command Influence; or Can the Court of Military Appeals Be This Wrong?, ARMY
LAW., Apr. 1992, at 19 (reviewing appellate cases involving instructional issues); Captain
Samuel J. Rob, From Treakle to Thomas: The Evolution of the Law of Unlawful
Command Influence, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1987, at 36 (assessing the impact of case law on
the evolution of laws regarding unlawful command influence); James Thwing, An
Appearance of Evil, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1983, at 13 (reviewing the problem with
establishing limits over command influence); Luther C. West, A History of Command
Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1970) (discussing
command influence).
36
SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 9.
37
Id.
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B. Trial Procedures
At trial, the accused is entitled to virtually the same procedural
protections he would have in a state or federal criminal court—largely
because Article 36(a) requires that the rules of procedure for military
courts parallel the procedures used in federal courts. For example, a
military accused has:










38

The right to a speedy trial (under the Sixth Amendment and
under a 120-day speedy trial provision in the Manual for CourtsMartial);38
The right to extensive discovery, including a right to access
witnesses and documents that is supposed to be equal to the
prosecution’s;39
The right to production of evidence for examination and
testing;40
The right to request witnesses, including expert witnesses at
Government expense;41
The right to request the assistance of experts at Government
expense in preparing for trial;42
The right to confront witnesses;43
The right to select either trial with members or trial by judge
alone;44
The right to request inclusion of enlisted members if the accused
selects trial by members (effectively a jury trial);45
The right to full voir dire of the court members and the right to
exercise both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges;46
The right to challenge the military judge for cause;47 and

UCMJ art. 10 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 707 (speedy trial rule). The 120day rule does not include delays requested by the defense; thus, a case may take much
longer than 120 days if the defense requests delays.
39
UCMJ art. 46 (2012); see MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701 (setting out rules for
discovery by both prosecution and defense counsel).
40
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(B).
41
Id. R.C.M. 703(d)(B)(i) (right to request employment of expert witness at government
expense).
42
Id. R.C.M. 702.
43
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
44
UCMJ art. 16 (2012).
45
Id. art. 25.
46
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 912.
47
Id. R.C.M. 902. For grounds for possible challenges to the military judge, see UCMJ
art. 26 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 502, 503 and 902.
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The right to file motions in limine, motions to suppress, and
motions to dismiss the charges on a wide range of grounds (for
example invoking constitutional privacy rights to dismiss rules
or regulations governing personal conduct).48

If an accused enters a guilty plea to any charges, the military judge is
required to conduct a detailed “providency” inquiry to insure that the
accused is pleading guilty voluntarily and knowingly,49 and that any
pretrial agreement accurately reflects the intent of both the government
and the accused50 and is consistent with public policy.51
If the accused pleads not guilty, and the case is tried on the merits,
the MRE apply during the trial.52 Those rules generally mirror the
Federal Rules of Evidence but include a number of rules not found there.
For example, Section III of the Military Rules includes very specific
guidance on searches and seizures (including evidence seized during
military inspections), confessions, eyewitness identification, and
interception of oral and wire communications. Section V contains
fourteen detailed rules governing privileges. In particular, Military Rule
of Evidence 505 provides very detailed guidance on disclosure of
classified information and Rule 506 provides equally specific guidance
of disclosure of government information that would be detrimental to the
public interest.
Sentencing is a separate phase of the court-martial, though it
typically occurs immediately after a finding of guilty.53 The Military
Rules of Evidence (unlike the federal rules) apply at the sentencing
phase.54 During sentencing, the accused is entitled to present witnesses
and other evidence for the court’s consideration, and to challenge the
prosecution’s evidence.55

48

MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 905. See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 13.
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 910; see United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A.
1969) (setting out requirements for what has become known as the Care inquiry).
50
United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453
(C.M.A. 1976).
51
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 910 (listing provisions which may make a pretrial
agreement impermissible).
52
See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, LEE D. SCHINASI & DAVID A. SCHLUETER,
MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (7th ed. 2011).
53
SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 16 (discussing sentencing procedures at courts-martial).
54
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001; id. MIL. R. EVID. 1101.
55
Id. R.C.M. 1001(c).
49
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C. Post-Trial Procedures and Appellate Review
Post-trial procedures are extremely detailed. A copy of the record of
trial is given to the accused, at no cost.56 Depending on the level of
punishment imposed, a formal legal review of the proceedings is
prepared.57 The post-trial review and recommendations are presented to
the convening authority for consideration.58 During that process the
accused has the right to present formally clemency matters.59 The
convening authority has the discretion to approve or disapprove any
findings of guilt and approve, suspend, or reduce the severity of the
sentence.60
For certain courts-martial, appellate review is automatic in the one of
the service Courts of Criminal Appeals.61 Appellate counsel is provided
free of charge.62 Members of those courts are high-ranking military
officers.63 Those courts are given fact-finding powers64 and have the
authority to reassess a court-martial sentence.65
An accused may petition for further review by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), which sits in Washington, D.C.66
That court is composed of five civilian judges, who are appointed by the
President for fifteen-year terms.67 The entire process from the initial trial
to review by the CAAF can take several years.68 During appellate
review, it is not unusual for one of the appellate courts to reverse a courtmartial conviction for violation of one of the many procedural rules
summarized above.

56

UCMJ art. 54(c) (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1104.
UCMJ art. 60(d) (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1106.
58
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1106.
59
Id. R.C.M. 1105.
60
UCMJ art. 60 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1107.
61
UCMJ art. 66 (2012).
62
Id. art. 70.
63
Id. art. 66.
64
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1203(b) discussion.
65
Id.
66
UCMJ art. 67 (2012).
67
Id.
68
See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 17-11, at 1150–60 (discussing post-trial
and appellate delays).
57
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In certain cases, a servicemember may seek certiorari review by the
Supreme Court of a decision by the CAAF.69
D. Summary
For purposes of this article, it is important to note several key points
from the foregoing discussion:





First, the commander is deeply involved in, and is an integral
part of, the military justice system.
Second, lawyers and judges are heavily involved at all levels in
the system.
Third, a military accused is entitled to most, if not all, of the
constitutional and statutory protections that are available to
someone being tried in a civilian court.
Fourth, the system provides a comprehensive right to appeal a
conviction.

III. Analyzing the Military Justice Conundrum
For the last sixty years, many commentators have vilified the
military justice system,70 defended it,71 and recommended reforms.72 For
69

UCMJ art. 67(h) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012). See generally Effron, supra note 22,
at 59 (overviewing the developments that led to the Military Justice Act).
70
Michael I. Spak, Military Justice: The Oxymoron of the 1980s, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 436
(1984); Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps, 28
SW. U. LAW REV. 481 (1999).
71
See Joseph W. Bishop, The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215 (1973)
(rejecting calls for abandonment of the military justice system); Major General William
A. Moorman, Fifty Years of Military Justice: Does the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Need to be Changed?, 48 A.F.L. REV. 185 (2000) (reaffirming military justice); Louis B.
Nichols, The Justice of Military Justice, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 482 (1971) (discussing
need for separate system); Poydasheff & Suter, supra note 5 (attempting to dispel
misconceptions of military justice).
72
See Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (And Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox
Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002
L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 57 (describing the origin and development of military justice and
the recommendations of the Cox Commission in 2001, and arguing that the current
system contains marks of an older system, which was primarily disciplinary in nature);
Colin A. Kisor, The Need for Sentencing Reform in Military Courts-Martial, 58 NAVAL
L. REV. 39 (2009) (proposing statutory reforms for military sentencing to remedy the
problem of unreasonably light sentences for very serious crimes); Henry B. Rothblatt,
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example, they have raised questions about the commander’s role in
selecting members to hear the case or about the role of the appellate
courts in reviewing courts-martial convictions. Virtually every one of
these commentators, whether addressing one part of the system or the
system as a whole, has discussed the relationship of the concepts of
justice and discipline.
Often the debate about the functions and purposes of a criminal
justice system is cast in terms such as “liberal,” conservative,”
“prosecution oriented,” “defense oriented, ”or “law and order.”73 Those
terms, while effective as sound bites, are not particularly helpful in
understanding the fundamentals of the debate. Something is missing. At
one level they may accurately capture a person's viewpoint about
criminal justice generally, or military justice specifically. But they do not
define the criteria or values for measuring the purposes and effectiveness
for a criminal justice system.
In examining the military criminal justice system, the terms “justice”
and “discipline” are often used to describe the two competing ideals or
values which inform the system. Although those terms, in themselves,
are ambiguous and fluid, they are very familiar to those working within
the system (commanders, lawyers, judges) and those responsible for its
structure (Congress). These terms frame the military justice conundrum.
Surprisingly, the UCMJ itself is silent on the issue of identifying the
purposes of the military justice system.74 Thus, one is left to review
secondary sources, such as the MCM and case law.
The following sections discuss three possible approaches to
analyzing the conundrum. Part IV discusses the various thematic
approaches that courts and commentators have used to address the
relationship between justice and discipline. Part V focuses on the
Military Justice: The Need for Change, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (1971) (recognizing
and rejecting the often emotionally charged criticisms of the system, but offering
constructive comments on proposals that would improve the military justice system);
Schlueter, supra note 11 (exploring the criticisms often leveled at the military justice
system and targeting a number of areas where the system seems most vulnerable, such as
size and composition of the courts-martial, and offering suggested changes).
73
See, e.g., Madhavi McCall & Michael McCall, Chief Justice William Rehnquist: His
Law and Order Legacy and Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REV. 323 (2006)
(discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s impact on criminal justice).
74
See Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 40 (noting the UCMJ’s failure to address
what the military justice system should accomplish).
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application of the crime control and due process models discussed in
Professor Packer’s law review article on that subject. Finally, Part VI
suggests using a purpose and functions approach to resolving the
conundrum.
IV. Thematic Approaches to the Conundrum
In addressing the military justice system, courts and commentators
often fall into one of several themes in deciding the purposes and
functions of the system. In many instances the themes overlap. Two or
more may be reflected in the same quote, testimony, or court opinion. In
other instances, the themes reflect diametrically opposed viewpoints.
The following discussion addresses those themes. Those who use
them may recognize the conundrum, but do not always attempt to resolve
the conflict between discipline and justice.

A. The “Deference” or “Hands-Off” Theme
The Supreme Court of United States has generally expressed an
attitude of deference in addressing issues arising under the military
justice system. Rarely does Court actually address the purpose or
function of military justice. Instead, a continuing theme is recognition of
the critical role that Congress plays in dealing with the competing values
of military justice and military discipline.75 From time to time the Court
75

There has been considerable commentary on the subject of review of courts-martial
convictions by federal courts, and the deference they usually pay to the military. See
generally Barney F. Bilello, Judicial Review and Soldiers’ Rights: Is the Principle of
Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465 (Winter 1989) (providing
review of the Supreme Court’s role in reviewing constitutional challenges to various
military regulations and procedures); Donald S. Burris & David Anthony Jones, Civilian
Courts and Courts-Martial—The Civilian Attorney’s Perspective, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
139 (1971) (exploring remedies that servicemembers have used in attempting to secure
relief in civilian courts from adverse court-martial determinations); John K. Chapman,
Reforming Federal Habeas Review of Military Convictions: Why AEDPA Would Improve
the Scope and Standard of Review, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (2004) (suggesting that courts
should apply standard and scope of review of the state habeas as under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) to
the military); Joshua E. Kastenberg, Cause and Effect: The Origins and Impact of Justice
William O. Douglas’s Anti-Military Ideology from World War II to O’Callahan v. Parker,
26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 163 (2009) (analyzing sources and effects of Justice Douglas’s
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says something about the nature of military justice, but for the most part
it defers to Congress and the President in this area. In Chappell v.
Wallace,76 the Supreme Court commented:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence. The
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to
the . . . control of a military force are essentially
professional military judgments.
The deference theme does not really address the conundrum. It
simply reflects the view that the military justice system is different, and
aversion to the legal construct of the military, particularly trial by court-martial); Major
Stanley Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 MIL. L.
REV. 3 (1980) (discussing the Supreme Court’s recognition of controlling principle of
“military necessity” in assessing the lawfulness of military regulations, orders, and laws);
Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918–2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907
(2006) (cataloging the Supreme Court’s tradition of deference to the military dating back
to cases in World War I to the more recent Guantánamo Bay case decisions); John F.
O’Connor, Statistics and the Military Deference Doctrine: A Response to Professor
Lichtman, 66 MD. L. REV. 668 (2007) (responding to article written by Professor Steven
B. Lichtman regarding the Military Deference Doctrine); John F. O’Connor, The Origins
and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000)
(exploring historical application of the military deference doctrine); Richard Rosen,
Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial,
108 MIL. L. REV. 5 (1985) (examining the relationship between civilian and military
courts and proposing a standard of collateral review that would define and equalize the
roles of the federal judiciary and the military courts); Edward Sherman, Judicial Review
of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REV.
483 (1969) (discussing historical basis for limited review and addressing those cases,
particularly Supreme Court decisions where a servicemember’s court-martial conviction
has been reviewed); Scott Silliman, The Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Court of
Military Appeals, 18 A.F. L. REV. 81 (1976) (commenting on the “philosophy” of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Military Appeals); Thomas Strassburg, Civilian Judicial
Review of Military Criminal Justice, 66 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1974) (discussing the role of
civilian courts in reviewing military courts-martial); Captain Dwight H. Sullivan, The
Last Line of Defense: Federal Habeas Review of Military Death Penalty Cases, 144 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (1994) (suggesting legislation to provide meaningful review of whether
constitutional error occurred at the court-martial); Donald T. Weckstein, Federal Court
Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and
Military Responsibilities, 54 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1971) (examining traditional deference paid
by the federal courts to unique military needs in the sensitive areas of due process and
constitutional rights and proposing guidelines to determine when federal review of
military proceedings is necessary).
76
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,
10 (1973)).
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that civilian judges should not attempt to resolve the issue of whether the
system is designed to promote discipline or justice.
B. The “Separatist” Theme
The military justice system is often described as a system separate
and apart from civilian justice systems. For example, in Parker v. Levy,77
the Court stated:
This Court has long recognized that the military is, by
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian
society. We have also recognized that the military has,
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its
own during its long history. The differences between the
military and civilian communities result from the fact
that “it is the primary business of armies and navies to
fight or ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise . . . ” In In re Grimley, the Court observed: “An
army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm.
Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open
as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of
obedience in the soldier.” More recently we noted that
“[t]he military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian,” and that “the rights of men in the armed
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . .”78
In United States v. Brown,79 the accused was charged with
organizing a strike and encouraging others to do so during Desert Storm.
In affirming his conviction, the court stated:
This court has been sensitive to First and Sixth
Amendments rights of servicemembers. But we are
mindful that [j]udges are not given the task of running
the Army . . . . The military constitutes a specialized
77

417 U.S. 733 (1974). In Parker, the Court held that Articles 133 and 134, UCMJ, were
not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Id.
78
Id. at 749 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
79
45 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

2013]

MILITARY JUSTICE CONUNDRUM

19

community governed by a separate discipline from that
of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the
judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate
Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to
intervene in judicial matters.80
In United States v. Hawthorne,81 the court addressed the issue of
whether a command-issued directive amounted to unlawful command
influence on the accused’s court-martial.82 The Court of Military Appeals
concluded that such influence had taken place and set aside the
conviction. In his concurring opinion, Judge Latimer commented that
“[i]n various areas involving disciplinary problems—of which judicial
procedure is a necessary part—the convening authority has certain
powers of his own, and unless he exceeds his authority he has a right to
control his subordinates without interference by this Court . . . .”
And in United States v. Borys,83 a case about the subject matter
jurisdiction of courts-martial, the court recognized the need for military
justice and that less favorable treatment of the defendant is necessary to
an effective fighting force. The court stated that “the justification for
such a system rests on the special needs of the military and history
teaches that expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain
carries with it a threat to liberty.”84
C. The “Primarily Discipline” Theme
From the beginnings of the United States’ military justice system,
courts85 and most commentators86 agreed that the system was designed to
80

Id. at 393 (citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)).
22 C.M.R. 83 (C.M.A. 1956).
82
The Commanding General of the Fourth Army had issued a directive stating that repeat
Regular Army offenders should be removed from the military. Id. at 87.
83
40 C.M.R. 259 (C.M.A. 1969).
84
Id. at 260 (citing O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969)). Under O’Callahan,
and therefore under Borys, courts-martial did not have jurisdiction over “civil crimes
committed in the United States against the civilian community when the local courts are
open and functioning,” unless the crimes were “military-connected.” This “military
connection” test has since been overturned. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447–
49 (1987).
85
See, e.g., O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969). Justice Douglas noted that
“a court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a
significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military
81
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protect and promote military discipline. The “discipline” theme is
generally reflected in court decisions addressing “purely military” crimes
established by the UCMJ, such as absence without leave. But courts and
commentators have also reflected this theme in discussing such issues as
UCMJ jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers87 and the authority of a
commander to impose nonjudicial punishment.88
In 1776, Congress directed John Adams to revise the 1775 Articles
of War. In addressing the new articles and the need for discipline, Adams
wrote to his wife, Abigail:
If I were an officer, I am convinced that I should be the
most decisive disciplinarian in the army . . . . Discipline
in an army is like the laws in a civil society. There can
be no liberty in a commonwealth where the laws are not
revered and most sacredly observed, nor can happiness

discipline is preserved.” Id. He cited an article by Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12
COLUM. F. 46, 49 (1969), who had asserted that “none of the travesties of justice
perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, for military law has always been
and continues to be primarily an instrument of discipline, not justice.” United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review v. Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328, 333 (C.M.A.
1988) (pointing out that a major objective of the military justice system is to obtain
obedience by subordinates to orders of their superiors).
86
See, e.g., Joseph W. Bishop, The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215 (1973)
(rejecting calls for abandonment of the military justice system and noting the need for
discipline); Stephen J. Carrol, A Proposal for Streamlining the Military Justice System,
36 NAVAL L. REV. 187, 188 (1986) (noting that prompt but fair discipline is a goal of any
criminal justice system); Ferris, supra note 8, at 445 (noting that “disciplinary function of
the court-martial cannot be overstated”). Cf. R. Rivkin, GI RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE:
THE SERVICEMAN’S GUIDE TO MILITARY LIFE AND LAW 336–38 (1970) (indicating that
studies showed that in a combat setting the fear of punishment is not a significant
motivation).
87
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (“We find
nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them
to rank along with Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people
charged with offenses . . . . [T]rial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental
to an army’s primary fighting function.”).
88
For example, in United States v. Gammons, 51 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F.1999), the court
addressed the question of whether trying a servicemember for a minor offense for which
the servicemember had already received nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ,
violated the double jeopardy clause. The court held that that clause did not apply because
Article 15 proceedings are not criminal proceedings—they are disciplinary in nature. Id.
at 173–74. See also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 31–31 (1976) (pointing out that
nonjudicial punishment is an administrative method of dealing with minor offenses).
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or safety in an army for a single hour when discipline is
not observed.89
General Sherman’s oft-quoted statement in a 1879 letter addressed
the issue of the role of the military legal system:
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human
being in a community all the liberty, security, and
happiness possible, consistent with the safety of all. The
object of military law is to govern armies composed of
strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the largest
measure of force at the will of the nation.
These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each
requires its own separate system of laws, statute and
common. An army is a collection of armed men obliged
to obey one man. Every enactment, every change of
rules which impairs the principle weakens the army,
impairs its values, and defeats the very object of its
existence. All the traditions of civil lawyers are
antagonistic to this vital principle, and military men
must meet them on the threshold of discussion, else
armies will become demoralized by even grafting on our
code their deductions from civil practice.90
Following World War I, there was a great debate among members of
the armed forces and commentators about the role of military justice and
the unjust treatment that servicemembers received under the system.91 In
response to calls for changes in the military justice system, Professor
John Henry Wigmore wrote:
89

PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 289 (1962), quoted in JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY
JUSTICE 6 (1992).
90
Letter to General W. S. Hancock, President of Military Serv. Inst., from W.T. Sherman
(Dec. 9, 1879), reprinted in GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, MILITARY LAW 130 (1880)
(reprinted from The Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States);
Frederick Bernays Weiner quoted this language in his testimony before the House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, March 16, 1949. Hearings on H.R. 2498
Before a Spec. Subcomn. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
780 (1949).
91
Schlueter, supra note 2, at 157–58; see also JOHN M. LINDLEY, “A SOLDIER IS ALSO A
CITIZEN”: THE CONTROVERSY OVER MILITARY JUSTICE, 1917–1920 (1990); MAJOR
GENERAL ENOCH H. CROWDER, MILITARY JUSTICE DURING THE WAR (1919), available at
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/MJ_during_war.html.
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The military system can say this for itself: It knows what
it wants; and it systematically goes in and gets it.
Civilian criminal justice does not even know what it
wants; much less does it resolutely go it and get
anything. Military justice wants discipline—that is,
action in obedience to regulations and orders; this being
absolutely necessary for prompt, competent, and
decisive handling of masses of men. The court-martial
system supplies the sanction of this discipline. It takes
on the features of Justice because it must naturally
perform the process of inquiring in a particular case,
what was the regulation or order, and whether it was in
fact obeyed. But its object is discipline.92
In its decision in O’Callahan v. Parker,93 the Supreme Court
established the service connection requirement for court-martial
jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemembers.94 The Court
addressed the criticisms of military justice and wrote that “[n]one of the
travesties of justice perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising,
for military law has always been and continues to be primarily an
instrument of discipline, not justice.”95
More recently, the three authors of a text on military justice noted in
their teachers’ manual for that text that:
Chapter 1 attempts to convey the raison d’être for
military law: the need to control the violence of war and
impose discipline in the ranks. Its central theme is the
tension between armed conflict and the rule of law, a

92

John H. Wigmore, Lessons from Military Justice, 4 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 151 (1921)
(emphasis added), reprinted in Joseph W. Bishop, The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL.
L. REV. 215, 218 (1973). Regarding this quote, Professor Bishop observed that the clarity
of purpose in the military justice system “compared favorably to the uncertainty of the
civilian penal system as to whether it wants retribution, or prevention, or deterrence.” Id.
93
395 U.S. 258 (1969).
94
After a historical review, the court came to this conclusion so that the Fifth
Amendment exception to the right of grand jury indictment (“except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces . . . when in actual service . . .”) would not “be expanded to
deprive every member of the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand
jury and a trial by a jury of his peers.” Id. at 272–73.
95
Id. at 266 (emphasis added) (quoting Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 COLUM. F.
46, 49 (1969)).
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tension that the substantive law and procedural rules of
military law attempt to resolve.96
In context, some of the foregoing statements reflecting the discipline
theme were made at times when there was a perceived threat that the
military justice system would be revised to more closely resemble, or be
replaced by, a civilian justice system.97
D. The “Justice-Based” Theme
In stark contrast to the “discipline” theme is the “justice-based”
theme. Some form of the “justice” theme has appeared in one form or
another for decades—at least since the early Twentieth Century when,
following World War I, there were concerted efforts (not always
successful) to include more procedural protections for servicemembers.98
In the 1980s the Department of Defense took bold steps to engraft the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
into military justice to the greatest extent possible.99 Those efforts

96

EUGENE R. FIDELL, ELIZABETH L. HILLMAN & DWIGHT H. SULLIVAN, MILITARY JUSTICE
CASES AND MATERIALS, TEACHERS’ MANUAL 1 (2d ed. 2012) (emphasis added). See
Colonel (Retired) Henry G. Green, Military Justice and Discipline: The Role of
Punishment in the Military, THE REPORTER, June 1997, at 9 (observing that “discipline” is
the sine qua non of an effective fighting force, the author presents a wide range of
thoughts and perspectives on the role of military justice and punishment); Dennis Hunt,
Trimming Military Jurisdiction: An Unrealistic Solution to Reforming Military Justice,
63 CRIM. L.C AND P.S. 23 (1972) (arguing that discipline is the only way to preserve law
and order and expanded jurisdiction of courts-martial is the only way to preserve
discipline).
97
See generally Lindsy Nicole Alleman, Who Is in Charge, and Who Should Be? The
Disciplinary Role of the Commander in Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
169 (2006) (providing an overview of the role of the commander in the military justice
system); Spak, supra note 70 (noting that military discipline does not require a broad
military justice system that encroaches upon the constitutional rights of military
personnel); Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12 (observing that the UCMJ is “too
slow, too cumbersome, too uncertain, indecisive, and lacking in power to reinforce
accomplishment of the military mission, to deter misconduct, or even to rehabilitate”).
98
In what is often referred to as the “Ansell-Crowder” dispute, General Crowder took a
position that emphasized the need for a strong system that focused on the discipline
component of military justice. Major Terry W. Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The
Emergence of General Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1967); LINDLEY, supra note
92, passim; CROWDER, supra note 91, passim.
99
See George R. Smawley, In Pursuit of Justice, A Life of Law and Public Service:
United States District Court Judge and Brigadier General (Retired) Wayne E. Alley (U.S.
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resulted in the adoption of the Military Rules of Evidence in 1980100 and
four years later, the 1984 MCM.
In the 1984 MCM the drafters added a Preamble, which addressed in
part the nature and purpose of military law.
3. Nature and purpose of military law.
***
The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to
assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the
armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in
the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the
national security of the United States.101
The fact that this language first addressed the purpose of promoting
justice and then second, the purpose of “maintaining good order and
discipline” signaled a shift, apparently resolving the military justice
conundrum in favor of the “justice” component.
Commentators citing the preamble have stated that the military
justice system is now “justice based.” For example, in their treatise on
court-martial practice, Colonel Gilligan and Professor Lederer have
stated that:
Insofar as our fundamental goal is concerned, it is clear
that military criminal law in the United States is justicebased. This is not, however, incompatible with
discipline. Congress has, at least implicitly, determined
that discipline within the American fighting force
requires that personnel believe that justice will be done.
In short, the United States uses a justice-oriented system
to ensure discipline; in our case, justice is essential to
discipline.102

Army 1952–1954, 1959–1981), 208 MIL. L. REV. 213 (2011) (recounting General Alley’s
role in the drafting of the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE)).
100
See Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules Of Evidence: Origins and Judicial
Implementation, 130 MIL. L. REV. 5 (1990) (discussing origins of MRE).
101
MCM, supra note 17, pmbl. (emphasis added).
102
1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC LEDERER, COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 1-20.00,
at 2 (1991) (emphasis added).
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More recently, the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force,
Lieutenant General Harding, addressed the question of instilling good
order and discipline and its important role in creating an effective combat
power. He wrote:
Due process enhances discipline. America’s mothers
and fathers send their sons and daughters to us to join
our all-volunteer force because they believe their
children will be fairly treated. They believe and expect
that we will adhere to due process in judging their
children, should they violate our code; otherwise, they
would not have sent them to us. As a result, when we
adhere to due process, we send a message to those
parents, parents of other prospective Airmen and all
Airmen everywhere that they can trust the Air Force to
treat its Airmen fairly and to protect and promote justice
within our service. By protecting our recruiting and
retention pipelines, due process safeguards our combat
effectiveness. Conversely, when we permit due process
to suffer, we discourage enlistment of America’s best
and brightest; we demoralize and discourage the
retention of currently-serving Airmen, who worry they
will likewise be treated unfairly, and as a consequence,
we degrade military discipline and combat effectiveness.
103

This view seems to take the justice-based theme to a new level.
While it usually accepted that the lack of due process in the military
justice system can adversely affect morale,104 it is quite another thing,
and certainly more difficult to prove, that due process actually enhances
discipline and is a motivation for individuals to join the armed forces.
It would be incorrect to assume that the conundrum can be resolved
by simply adopting either the discipline theme approach or the justice

103

Lieutenant General Richard C. Harding, A Revival in Military Justice, REPORTER,
Summer 2010, at 4 (bold heading in original, emphasis added).
104
See, e.g., Timothy W. Murphy, A Defense of the Role of the Convening Authority: The
Integration of Justice and Discipline, 28 No. 3 THE REPORTER 3 (2001) (stating that if
troops perceive that courts-martial are arbitrary and unjust, disciplinary effect will be
destroyed); Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 66–67 (noting results of survey of
officers attending the Army War College).
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theme approach.105 Many of the following themes reflect an attempt to
reconcile the two main components.
E. The “Competing Interests” Theme
A number of themes attempt to consider both justice and discipline
together. The first of these is the “competing interests” theme. The
accused in United States v. Perry106 was convicted of violating a lawful
general regulation. The accused argued that the regulation had been
promulgated by the base commander who had then convened the courtmartial to try the accused. The Air Force Board of Review concluded
that the convening authority’s interest in the case was only official and
stated that:
Actually the question is more basic than appears for it
concerns the official duties of a commander as well as
the right of an accused to be tried by an impartial court.
There is no question but that a commander is required by
law, regulation or custom to issue such orders and
publish such regulations or directives as may be
necessary for the proper administration of his command.
His official duties require that he not only maintain
discipline but also compel compliance with such official
orders, regulations and/or directives he has found
necessary, in his sound discretion, to promulgate. On the
other hand there is no question but that an accused is
entitled to a fair trial by an impartial court.107
The court concluded that the convening authority’s interest in the
case was official rather than personal, and as such did not render the trial
unfair.108 But in using this language, it implicitly recognized that the
105

See, e.g., Ferris, supra note 8, at 446 (stating that historically, the “primary purpose of
the courts martial [sic] was to regulate the military conduct of servicemen,” signaling that
under the current military justice system the primary function is provide justice)
(emphasis added). Any implication in the justice theme that the military justice system is
no longer concerned with governing the conduct or misconduct of servicemembers is not
true. As noted in the discussion at Part V.E.1.d., above, elements of the current military
justice system clearly represent the need for a commander to be able to deal with
servicemembers who engage in misconduct.
106
12 C.M.R. 894 (A.F.B.R. 1953).
107
Id. at 896 (emphasis added).
108
Id. at 897.
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needs of justice (having the case tried by an impartial tribunal) were in
competition with the needs of discipline (having the commander both
issue orders and send Airmen to trial for violating those orders).
F. The “Inseparable” Theme
Another thematic approach to the conundrum is to view the
discipline and justice components as interrelated, integrated, or
inseparable.
In the Powell Report to the Secretary of the Army in 1960 on the
status of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Committee
(composed of distinguished high-ranking Army officers) noted:
Discipline—a state of mind which leads to a willingness
to obey an order no matter how unpleasant or dangerous
the task to be performed—is not a characteristic of a
civilian community. Development of this state of mind
among soldiers is a command responsibility and a
necessity. In the development of discipline, correction of
individuals is indispensable; in correction, fairness or
justice is indispensable. Thus, it is a mistake to talk of
balancing discipline and justice—the two are
inseparable . . .
Once a case is before a court-martial it should be
realized by all concerned that the sole concern is to
accomplish justice under the law. This does not mean
justice as determined by the commander referring a case
or by anyone not duly constituted to fulfill a judicial
role. It is not proper to say that a military court-martial
has a dual function as an instrument of discipline and as
an instrument of justice. It is an instrument of justice and
in fulfilling this function it will promote discipline.109

109

AD HOC COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT TO
HON. WILLIAM R. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 11–12 (18 Jan. 1960) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Powell_report.pdf.
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In United States v. Littrice,110 the Court of Military Appeals
addressed the question of unlawful command influence on the accused’s
court-martial. The court addressed Congress’s concerns about that issue
in adopting the UCMJ. Writing for the court, Judge Latimer stated:
It was generally recognized that military justice and
military discipline were essentially interwoven.
Nevertheless, a sharp conflict arose between those who
believed the maintenance of military discipline with the
armed forces required that commanding officers control
the courts-martial proceedings and those who believed
that unless control of the judicial machinery was taken
away from the commanders military justice would
always be a mockery.111
G. The “Two Sides of the Same Coin” Theme
Related to the “inseparable” theme, discussed supra, is the theme
that views the justice and discipline components as different sides of the
same coin. In his article on the role of the Court of Military Appeals in
the 1970’s, Captain John Cooke wrote:
The precept [of the relationship of justice and discipline]
has generally been reflected in the tendency of the court
to distinguish and separate functions exercised by the
commander and other line personnel. The commander is
permitted to retain his disciplinary functions, but his
functions in administering justice (i.e. judicial functions)
have been taken from him. This dichotomization has
been effectuated in other ways as well, as the court has
attempted to guard against what it perceives as undue
infringement of the integrity of the administration of
justice by disciplinary activities and attitudes. This
tendency deserves close scrutiny, for it must be
recognized that justice and discipline are properly but
two sides of the same coin; to the extent that the court

110
111

13 C.M.R. 43 (C.M.A. 1953).
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
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separates them unnecessarily, it risks devaluing the
whole system.112
However, Generals Westmoreland and Prugh, in a later article,
presented a different view of this theme:
It is misleading to regard justice and discipline as
different sides of the same coin, if the statement is to
imply that the two concepts are opposites or
complementary; that discipline must be balanced by
justice, and vice versa. Discipline is but one tool for a
commander, albeit an important, even essential, one; its
essential focus addresses mission accomplishment.
Justice encompasses fairness to the individual who may
be accused of military wrongdoing and prosecution of
such an accused only in accordance with the law. The
two ideas are quite disparate—if one is an apple, the
other is an orange.
It is submitted that the other side of the coin from justice
should more accurately be called military exigency. This
is very different from discipline, which envisions
conduct responsive to established rules.113
H. The “Middle Ground” Theme
In 1946, the Secretary of War appointed a War Department Advisory
Committee on Military Justice, whose members were nominated by the
American Bar Association. A “middle ground” theme appears in the
report of this committee, sometimes referred to as the Vanderbilt Report
after the chair of the committee, Arthur Vanderbilt. The Committee was
formed to study the extant system of military justice and to make
recommendations for changes. In its report, the Committee stated:
A high military commander pressed by the awful
responsibilities of his position and the need for speedy
112

Captain John S. Cooke, The United States Court of Military Appeals, 1975–1977:
Judicializing the Military Justice System, 76 MIL. L. REV. 43, 52 (Spring 1977) (emphasis
added).
113
Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 48 (emphasis added).
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action has no sympathy with legal obstructions and
delays, and is prone to regard the courts-martial
primarily as instruments for enforcing discipline by
instilling fear and inflicting punishment, and he does not
always perceive that the more closely he can adhere to
civilian standards of justice, the more likely he will be to
maintain the respect and the morale of troops recently
drawn from the body of the people
Some of the critics of the Army system err on the other
side and demand the meticulous preservation of the
safeguards of the civil courts in the administration of
justice in the courts of the Army. We reject this view for
we think there is a middle ground between the viewpoint
of the lawyer and the viewpoint of the general.114
114

REPORT OF WAR DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 5 (13 Dec.
1946) [hereinafter VANDERBILT REPORT] (emphasis added), available at http://www.loc.
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/report-war-dept-advisory-committee.pdf..
The
Report,
commonly referred to as the Vanderbilt Report, was submitted by an Advisory
Committee appointed by Edward F. Witsell, Sec’y of War, War Dep’t Memorandum No.
25–46 (25 Mar. 1946). Arthur T. Vanderbilt chaired the committee (later he became
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court) which consisted of members and judges
of the civilian bar, from various states. The appointing memorandum stated:
The function of the Committee will be to study the administration of
military justice within the Army and the Army's courts-martial
system, and to make recommendations to the Secretary of War as to
changes in existing laws, regulations, and practices which the
Committee considers necessary or appropriate to improve the
administration of military justice in the Army.
Id. at 2. The Advisory Committee heard testimony from numerous senior military
officials at hearings conducted in Washington, D.C., heard additional testimony at
regional public hearings and considered hundreds of letters, the results of a questionnaire
sent to officers and enlisted men, and statistical and result studies prepared by the Judge
Advocate General’s Department. Id. at 5.
Attachments to the Committee’s report include answers by respondents to a number
of questions posed by the Committee. The first question focused on “The purposes of the
court-martial system: maintenance of discipline or administration of justice?” The
Committee reported that “Fifty-two [general officers] indicated that the purpose was a
combination of justice and discipline. Only four listed discipline as the primary purpose,
and six emphasized justice.” Id. at 1 (Compilation of Answers), located at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Vanderbilt-B_Outline.pdf. For results from a
similar survey taken at the Army War College in 1971–72. See Colonel Joseph N. Tenhet
& Colonel Robert B. Clarke, Attitudes of US Army War College Students Toward the
Administration of Military Justice, 59 MIL. L. REV. 27 (1973).
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The Advisory Committee was one of several bodies considering
changes to the military justice system. In 1948, Secretary of Defense
James Forrestal appointed a special committee, chaired by Professor
Edmund Morgan, to consider drafting a uniform code of justice that
would apply to all of the services.115
Professor Morgan’s subsequent testimony regarding the proposed
uniform code presented yet another theme—“the fair and delicate
balance” theme, infra.
I. The “Fair and Delicate Balance” Theme
In his statement to Congress in 1949, concerning the proposed
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Professor Edmund Morgan116 stated:
We are convinced that a Code of Military Justice cannot
ignore the military circumstances under which it must
Similarly, the Committee received responses to the same question from judge
advocates (combat, regular Army judge advocates, Board of Review judge advocates, and
staff judge advocates). The Committee reported their answers to that question in chart
form. See http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Vanderbilt-B_Outline.pdf. In
contrast to the responses from the general officers, thirty-five judge advocates indicated
that the purpose of the court-martial system was to maintain discipline and administer
justice; ten judge advocates listed discipline as the primary purpose and six listed justice
as the primary purpose. Interestingly, of the six listing justice, three were on the Army
Board of Review.
In its report the Committee also stated,
We desire to make it clear at the outset that our findings are not based on the
testimony of convicted men or their friends. Complaints from that source were
considered by the committee headed by Justice Owen J. Roberts who examined
court-martial sentences for severity after the war and many instances reduced
them.
VANDERBILT REPORT, supra, at 2.
The appointment of this committee resulted from correspondence from Senator Chan
Gurney, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to Secretary Forrestal.
Senator Gurney had written that his Committee was considering a number of proposals
for changing the military justice system but that there had been no proposal to consider
and recommend a uniform system of military justice. The correspondence between
Senator Gurney and Secretary Forrestal can be viewed at http://www.loc.gov/
rr/frd/Military_Law/Morgan-Papers/Vol-I_correspondence.pdf.
116
In 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal appointed Professor Morgan to serve as
the chair of a special committee to draft a uniform code of justice that would apply to all
of the armed services.
115
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operate but we were equally determined that it must be
designated to administer justice.
We therefore, aimed at providing functions for the
command and appropriate procedures for the
administration of justice. We have done our best to strike
a fair balance, and believe that we have given
appropriate recognition of each factor.117
Five years later the Court of Military Appeals recognized this theme
in United States v. Littrice,118 a case addressing the issue of command
influence. The court stated:
Thus, confronted with the necessity of maintaining a
delicate balance between justice and discipline, Congress
liberalized the military judicial system but also permitted
commanding officers to retain many of the powers held
by them under prior laws. While it struck a compromise,
Congress expressed an intent to free courts-martial
members from any improper and undue influence by
commanders which might affect an honest and
conscientious consideration of the guilt or innocence of
an accused. Both the Code and the Manual announce the
same caveat. . . .
On the command side of the ledger, we find some
provisions which indicate that [the commander] is not to
be too tightly fettered by the new Code.
***
The same delicate balance which beset Congress now confronts
us. Justice can be dispensed and discipline maintained if one is
not permitted to overwhelm the other. Both should be given
recognition and both must be governed and guided by the
necessities peculiar to the military service.119

117
INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 606 (2000
Reprint, Hein).
118
13 C.M.R. 43 (C.M.A. 1953).
119
Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Coates, 25 C.M.R. 559, 564
(A.B.R. 1958) (quoting this language from Littrice).
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J. The “Emasculation” Theme
Regardless of how one views the military justice conundrum, it is
clear that lawyers have been deeply involved in addressing military
justice issues.120 In a letter to General W.S. Hancock, in 1879, General
William T. Sherman addressed the role of lawyers in military justice. He
stated:
I agree that it will be a grave error if by negligence we
permit the military law to become emasculated by
allowing lawyers to inject into it the principles derived
from their practice in the civil courts, which belong to a
totally different system of jurisprudence.121
General Sherman, a lawyer himself, continued by stating that the
needs of the military are unique and that civil justice systems standards
and procedures can threaten the military.122 This theme, while colorful,
may be still be shared by some who view lawyers with skepticism—
especially by those who are concerned that the role of the commander
has been replaced by armed forces lawyers and judges.
K. The “Un-American” Theme
As noted above, after World War I there was heated debate about the
function and role of military justice in what has become known as the
“Ansell-Crowder” dispute.123 The controversy centered in part, on the
question of whether courts-martial were actually judicial bodies or
120

Brigadier General (Retired) John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, ARMY LAW, Mar. 2000, at 1, 1 (noting participation of judge advocates
in development of military justice system).
121
Letter to General W. S. Hancock, supra note 90; See also THE ARMY LAWYER: A
HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, 1775–1975, at 12 (1975)
[hereinafter JAGC HISTORY].
122
Id. Professor Turley notes that Sherman’s concern was that the military “should resist
external influences, particularly legal values,” and emphasized the “cultural necessities of
the military community in contrast to those of the larger republic.” Jonathan Turley, The
Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 97 (2002).
123
See Frederick B. Weiner, The Seamy Side of the World War I Court-Martial
Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REV. 109 (1989) (recounting what has been labeled the
“Crowder-Ansell” dispute concerning court-martial practices during World War I). See
also Major Terry W. Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of General
Samuel T Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1967).
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instead agencies of the Executive Branch. The latter position was taken
by Colonel Winthrop in his treatise124 and by General Crowder. In sharp
contrast, General Ansell125 took the position that courts-martial were
judicial in nature and that it was important to create an appellate court to
review courts-martial convictions to insure that abuses did not occur at
the trial level. In a 1919 law review article General Ansell wrote that:
I contend—and I have gratifying evidence of support not
only from the public generally but from the profession—
that the existing system of Military Justice is unAmerican, having come to us by inheritance and rather
witless adoption out of a system of government which
we regard as fundamentally intolerable; that it is archaic,
belonging as it does to an age when armies were but
bodies of armed retainers and bands of mercenaries; that
it is a system arising out of and regulated by the mere
power of Military Command rather than Law; and that it
has ever resulted, as it must ever result, in such injustice
as to crush the spirit of the individual subjected to it,
shock the public conscience and alienate public esteem
and affection from the Army that insists on maintaining
it.126

124

WINTHROP, supra note 14, at 48. Colonel Winthrop stated that courts-martial did not
belong to the judicial department and were thus simply “instrumentalities of the executive
power.”
125
At the time of the internal dispute between the two generals, Ansell was informally
acting as the Judge Advocate General, in the absence of Crowder, the Judge Advocate
General, who had been assigned the task of running the Selective Service System. LURIE,
supra note 89, at 48.
126
Samuel Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1919) (emphasis added). See also
Samuel Ansell, Some Reforms in Our System of Military Justice, 32 YALE L.J. 146 (1922)
(discussing proposed amendments to the Articles of War). In his Yale Law Journal
article, General Ansell cited the preface to the proposed bill:
The primary principle of this Bill is to establish Military Justice, and
regulate it by Law rather than by mere Military Command; or, stating
it differently, to supersede personal Military Power over Military
Justice by Public Law, to be effective for this purpose, must be law in
its primary sense—a rule established beyond the control of the
Department and the Army which are to administer it. . . .
Id. at 151 (citing Senate Committee Print of S. 64, 66th Congress, 1st Session 2
et seq. (1919)).
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General Ansell’s ideas about creating appellate courts to review
courts-martial did not come to fruition until almost three decades later,127
with the adoption of the UCMJ.128
L. The “Justice and Discipline Are Not Opposites” Theme
In his testimony before Congress in 1949 on the proposed UCMJ,
Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener testified as follows:
Colonel Weiner. It is sometimes asked what is the object
of military law. It is generally put as a personal
question. Do you consider that the object of military law
is to maintain discipline or to maintain justice? My
answer always is that those are not opposites. You
cannot maintain discipline by administering justice. The
standards of guilt and innocence in military law are not
different from civil law. Possibly there is a little more
relaxation on what is harmless error than in the civil
courts. But the real difference is the object and the
amount of punishment. The object of the civilian
criminal court generally is to reform and rehabilitate the
offenders. The object of the military law is not
vindictiveness. It is to act as a deterrent so that when the
first man steps out of line and gets a hard sentence it will
deter others.
Mr. Rivers. In that connection there is no use for us to
confuse the basic objective of keeping morale with the
ultimate disposition of justice.
Colonel Wiener. Precisely.
127

In his book, Arming Military Justice: The Origins of the United States Court of
Military Appeals, 1775–1950, Jonathan Lurie notes that in contrast to General Crowder,
who was “reflective, somewhat hesitant in manner, and comfortable in a bureaucratic
environment,” General Ansell was “much more aggressive in manner,” “impatient to get
results,” and “believed very deeply in his causes.” That might explain, at least in part, his
strident and overreaching comments about military justice. JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING
MILITARY JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS,
1775–1950, at 50–51 (1992).
128
Ironically, Professor Edmund Morgan (who was then teaching at Harvard) had served
as an Army Judge Advocate under General Ansell and three decades later chaired the
committee that drafted the new uniform code, which created the Court of Military
Appeals—one of life’s ironies.
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Mr. Rivers. And they need not be opposites.129
Colonel Weiner continued by testifying that the purpose of military
justice was to act as a deterrent to other servicemembers:
Colonel Wiener. But the military justice has to be swift
and its punishment will frequently be more severe. There
is always an irreducible number in any group,
particularly in a large number raised by selective service,
who can only be ruled by fear and compulsion. If you
have a system of military justice which minimizes a
possibility that a guilty man can “beat the rap,” then you
have an effective system of military justice. The more
loopholes you inject the more the man feels, “Oh, well, I
can get a lawyer; I can appeal it on up; I can get off.” To
that extent you impair the object of military law. I am
not suggesting that anybody be sent to the guardhouse
on general principles or anything like that. You do have
the irreducible minimum that can only be ruled by fear.
You do have the necessity for swift and sure
punishment, and you do have to have a feeling in the
sense of the individual, “Well, maybe I had better not,
because dire punishment will follow.130
M. The “Justice and Discipline Are Not Synonymous” Theme
In contrast to the “not opposites” theme, supra, is the opinion of the
Coast Guard Board of Review in United States v. McCarty.131 In that
case, the board addressed the aims of punishment in the military criminal
justice system in a desertion case. The court noted that
[s]ociety, whether military or civilian, still insists on
punishment for crimes and offenses. In the military
where approximately 75% of all offenses involve
unauthorized absence (which is no crime at all in civil
129
INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 780 (2000
Reprint, Hein) (emphasis added).
130
Id. at 781. For a discussion about the role of deterrence in sentencing, see Part
V.E.1.h, infra.
131
29 C.M.R. 757 (C.G.B.R. 1960).
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life) punishment is thought necessary in the interest of
military discipline. Even so, the Navy long since
recognized that “Discipline and punishment are not
always synonymous . . . . The question of punishment
can be considered only when the cause of the offense has
been correctly determined. Severity of punishment alone
has never provided an answer to penal and disciplinary
problems.”132
N. The “Oxymoron” Theme
In his law review article objecting to any expansion of court-martial
jurisdiction over servicemembers, Professor Spak wrote:
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
military personnel are denied the right to grand jury
indictment, trial by impartial jury, and bail. In addition,
military personnel are denied the right to independent
counsel. There is no doubt that military personnel enjoy
less constitutional rights than their civilian counterparts.
It is this author's aim to extend all of the constitutional
rights traditionally enjoyed by United States citizens to
military personnel absent compelling justification.
Therefore, it is contended that court-martial jurisdiction
should be limited to those statutory offenses that require
military status and therefore should apply exclusively to
members of the armed forces. In sum, it is the author's
thesis that military justice is the oxymoron of the
1980's.133

132
133

Id. at 762 (quoting NAVAL JUSTICE 48, 51 (1949)) (emphasis added).
Spak, supra note 70, at 437–38 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). He also stated:
An additional reason to restrict court-martial jurisdiction is found in
the very nature of procedural military justice. Although not all
aspects of military criminal procedure are narrower than their civilian
counterpart, on balance, Military Criminal Procedure is so ineffective
in protecting the constitutional rights of military personnel, that it
passes the point of being obscene.

Id. at 457 (emphasis added). To support this proposition, Professor Spak cited L. WEST,
THEY CALL IT JUSTICE (1977) and R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS
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O. The “Hybrid” Theme
One commentator has recommended that the military justice system
could be streamlined by, for example, eliminating the right of a
servicemember to refuse nonjudicial punishment and by addressing
delays in the Article 32 investigation. In addressing those issues, he
noted:
Throughout history, members of the military have been
subjected to a separate criminal justice system oriented
toward reinforcement of proper behavior and
punishment of misbehavior. Initially, commanding
officers had complete control over the courts-martial
process. A formal criminal court system consisting of
trial and appellate judges did not exist. Over the course
of United States history, civilian notions of criminal
justice and criminal trial practice have been fused into
the court-martial system. Following World War II, many
of these notions were statutorily imposed on the armed
forces. Today the court-martial is a hybrid criminal trial
with remnants of the earlier command-controlled
model.134
The hybrid theme, at least as it is presented in the quote, assumes
that the role of the commander is no longer what it once was. That is not
entirely true, as noted in Part V.E.1.d, below.
P. The “Legitimation” Theme
One writer—in focusing on the legitimacy of the military justice
system—made the following observation:
Legitimacy is an essential feature of an effective system
of criminal justice. In order to maintain authority over
those it regulates, a criminal justice system must remain
legitimate in the eyes of those people. When people
MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC (1971), which in the ’70s and ’80s were often cited by
critics of the military justice system.
134
Stephen J. Carrol, A Proposal for Streamlining the Military Justice System, 36 NAVAL
L. REV. 187, 187–88 (1986) (emphasis added).
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perceive the criminal process as fair and legitimate, they
are more likely to accept its results as accurate and are
more likely to obey the substantive laws that the system
enforces. Moreover, such people are more likely to
cooperate with police and prosecutors, who necessarily
rely on the trust of the community to carry out their roles
in the criminal justice system.135
The author continues by noting that the legitimacy of a criminal
justice system is enhanced when “observers and defendants believe that
prosecutors are pursuing justice.”136
This theme relates to the view often expressed in conjunction with
the “justice-based” theme, supra, that regardless of the commander’s
need to maintain good order and discipline, if the command perceives
that a servicemember has not been treated fairly by the system, discipline
may actually suffer in the long run.
Q. The “Paternalistic” Theme
Some have viewed the military justice system as being paternalistic.
For example, in United States v. Sunzeri,137 the court concluded that a
provision in the accused’s pretrial agreement that he could not present
the testimony of certain witnesses during sentencing violated the
MCM.138 In dissent, one of the judges wrote:
The military justice system, as it is currently designed
and has developed—with its post-World War II
philosophy, revisions, and implementation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice—is quite paternalistic
in some regards, with its numerous built-in safeguards to
protect the individual servicemember in his or her quest
to navigate, in his or her best interests, the treacherous
135

Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123
HARV. L. REV. 937, 941–42 (2010) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
136
Id. at 942. See also Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental
Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105 (2005)
(discussing legitimacy of criminal justice systems from subjective viewpoint of
observers).
137
59 M.J. 758 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2004).
138
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B).
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waters of military discipline. While there is, of course,
absolutely nothing wrong with this approach, I think
sometimes we may let it color too much our reading and
interpretation of those safeguards.139
In contrast to that position, the court in United States v. Rivera,140
five years earlier had observed that the military justice system had grown
less paternalistic.141
R. The “Civilianization” Theme
Commentators who recommend reforms to the military justice
system typically compare the system to civilian counterparts, whether in
the United States or other countries. Apparently the belief is that the
civilian system reflects qualities that should be applied to pretrial, trial,
and appellate proceedings in the military. For example, Professor
Sherman has observed:
The American court-martial, with its commanddominated structure, all military personnel, commanderselected jury primarily from the officer class, inadequate
pre-trial procedures, and limited appeals, provides
servicemen with an inferior form of criminal justice.
Proposed reforms of the UCMJ would remedy some of
these problems but would leave intact the structure of
court-martial, with its intrinsic relationship to military
139

Sunzeri, 59 M.J. at 762 (emphasis added).
44 M.J. 527 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
141
Id. at 530. See United States v. Shelwood, 15 M.J. 222, 224 n.1 (C.M.A. 1983) (noting
that MRE 103(a)(1) is less paternalistic than pre-Rule standards); United States v. Means,
20 M.J. 522, 528 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (stating that development of independent defense
counsel system was a fundamental change in policy that “transformed an excessively
paternalistic system for litigating criminal cases into a truly adversarial one”). See also
Captain John A. Schaefer, Current Effective Assistance of Counsel Standards, ARMY
LAW., June 1986, at 7, 16 (pointing out that the military justice system has transformed
courts-martial from being excessively paternalistic to adversarial); Corey Wielert,
Affecting the Bargaining Process in Pretrial Agreements: Waiving Appellate Rights in
the Military Justice System, 79 UMKC L. REV. 237, 254 (2010) (arguing that military
justice has transformed from paternalistic system to more adversarial, especially
regarding waiver of Article 32 investigations); Major Eugene Milhizer, Curing Variance
on Appeal, ARMY LAW., July 1991, at 32 (proffering that the trend is to rely on counsel
rather than on paternalistic protection of trial and appellate judges).
140
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disciplinary policies and control. Reforms along the lines
of either the British or West German-Swedish models,
resulting in the separation and civilianization of military
justice functions, appear to be a feasible way to provide
American servicemen with greater justice.142
The suggested reforms, which many believe would truly
“civilianize” the military justice system, generally focus on removing the
commander from the equation.143 In contrast to that position, Judge Raby
of the Army Court of Criminal Review wrote:
[I] wish to muse whether we gatekeepers of military law
are not inadvertently finding more and more novel ways
in which gradually to ease line officers and commanders
out of the military system—moving it ever closer to the
civilian justice model. Quarere: If this trend continues,
could we reach a point, in futuro, where the military
justice system is no longer unique, and thus is no longer
necessary?144
S. The “Judicialization” Theme
The judicialization theme is used to describe the process of treating
the commander as a judicial officer for some functions in the military

142

Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L. J. 1398,
1425 (1973) (emphasis added). See also Robinson O. Everett, Some Comments on the
Civilianization of Military Justice, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1980, at 1 (noting that if by
“civilianization” it meant ignoring the uniqueness of military justice, he was opposed but
that he favored civilianization if it meant an “acknowledgement that certain basic ethical
norms apply to the military as well as the civilian”). Cf. Karlen, supra note 9 (questioning
whether military justice system should import problems often encountered in civilian
system).
143
Recently, there have been suggestions that the prosecution of sexual assault offenses
by servicemembers should be handled by civilian prosecutors. Statement by Professor
Beth Hillman before the Civil Rights Commission, January 11, 2013, available at
http://www.c-span.org/Events/Military-Commission-Holds-Forum-on-SexualAssault/10737437187/. Professor Hillman states that when compared to military justice
systems in other countries, the United States’ system is an “outlier.” Id.
144
United States v, Ralston, 24 M.J. 709, 711 (A.C.M.R. 1987) (appendix to opinion).
See also Cox, supra note 2, at 28–30 (commenting on the civilianization of military
justice).
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justice system145 and to stress the important role of military judges.146 In
addition, it reflects the growing role of the appellate courts in
interpreting, and at times expanding, the due process protections
available to an accused servicemember. In commenting on the role of the
Court of Military Appeals in the 1970’s, then-Captain John Cooke
summarized this theme by observing:
[T]he court has substantially shifted the balance of
power in the system by invalidating or restricting powers
previously exercised by commanders and other line
personnel, and by depositing greater ultimate authority
in the hands of lawyers and judges. More subtly, the
court has endeavored to adjust the attitudes with which
all participants in the system exercise their particular
authority.147
T. The “Can’t Get No Respect” Theme
As demonstrated by some of the themes presented in this section,
critics of the military justice system often show a complete lack of
respect for its purpose, content, or operation. As one writer has observed:
The true depth and breadth of the [criticisms] is
unknown. As far as I know, no recent national surveys
have been conducted among the citizenry about their
perceptions or feelings about military justice.
Nevertheless, I do feel safe in believing that a broad
cross-section of intelligent people either know very little
about military justice or, if they do know something
145

Major Donald W. Hansen, Judicial Functions of the Commander, 41 MIL. L. REV. 1
(1968); Victor M. Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes and the Role of the
Military Commander: What Should the United States Learn from This Revolution? 16
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 419, 423 (2008).
146
Henry A. Cretella & Norman B. Lynch, The Military Judge: Military or Judge, 9 CAL.
W. L. REV. 57 (1972) (discussing evolution of military judge’s role); Major Fansu Ku,
From Law Member to Military Judge: The Continuing Evolution of an Independent Trial
Judiciary in the Twenty-First Century, 199 MIL. L. REV. 49 (2009) (suggesting methods
of cultivating judicial independence); Major Gilbert D. Stevenson, The Inherent Authority
of the Military Judge, 17 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1975) (discussing emerging importance of
military judges); Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 18 (discussing role of military
judges).
147
Cooke, supra note 112, at 44.
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about the system, they believe that it is still in the dark
ages, void of any full legal recognition, and certainly not
deserving of a full membership in the family of
enlightened jurisprudence. Clearly, it does not deserve
“respect.”148
U. The “No Perfect Solution” Theme
The final theme reflects the view that while everyone understands
the importance of striking some sort of balance between discipline and
justice, there is no real solution. For example, in his statement to the
House Armed Services Subcommittee on the proposed UCMJ, Secretary
of Defense James Forrestal addressed the process of drafting the
proposed code: He stated:
Another problem faced by the [special committee
charged with preparing a draft of the code] was to devise
a code which would insure the maximum amount of
justice within the framework of a military organization.
We are all aware of the number of criticisms which have
been leveled against the court-martial system over the
years . . . .The point of proper accommodation between
the meting out of justice and the performance of military
operations—which involved not only the fighting, but
also the winning of wars—is one which no one has
discovered. I do not know of any expert on the subject—
military or civilian—who can be said to have the perfect
solution. Suffice it to say, we are striving for maximum
military performance and maximum justice. I believe the
proposed code is the nearest approach to those ideals.149

148

David A. Schlueter, The Twentieth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Military
Justice for the 1990's—A Legal System Looking for Respect, 133 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4–5
(1991) (emphasis added).
149
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Armed Services, 81st Cong. 597 (Mar. 7, 1949) (statement of James Forrestal, Secretary
of Defense) (emphasis added), available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/13963097
?n=4875&printThumbnails=no.
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V. Summary of Thematic Approaches
The foregoing themes reflect a variety of approaches to the military
justice conundrum. They cover more than a hundred years of
commentary on the American military justice system. While the theme of
“discipline” seems to have dominated the discussion in the early and
mid-years of the system, more recent court decisions and commentaries
seem to favor the “justice” component.150
There are several reasons for that. First, since the nineteenth century,
but especially since the 1930s, there has been a movement in the United
States to codify the country’s legal systems. That is, there has been a
move to codify a growing body of law, such as state criminal law and the
Federal Rules of Procedure and Evidence.151 The expansion of rules, in
turn, tends to emphasize procedural due process concerns in both civil
and criminal procedure. The military justice system reflects that trend.
While the UCMJ has remained fairly static, the MCM has grown in scope
and coverage exponentially.
Second, the shift in themes reflects the reality that the CAAF and the
service Courts of Criminal Appeals have played a strong and persistent
role in the factual and legal review of courts-martial. This was especially
so during the 1970s when the then Court of Military Appeals took bold

150

See generally Ferris, supra note 8, at 442–52 (noting the that history of the courtmartial reflects an evolution from discipline to justice).
151
See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 83–86 (1977) (noting process of
adopting Uniform Commercial Code); Colin Miller, Virginia to Codify Its Rules of
Evidence Effective July 1, 2012, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/04/virginia-to-codify-its-rules-ofevidence-effective-july-1-2012.html (noting that Virginia was codifying its common-law
rules of evidence effective July 1, 2012, leaving Massachusetts as the last state not to
have done so); Fred L. Borch, The Military Rules of Evidence: A Short History of Their
Origin and Adoption at Courts-Martial, ARMY LAW., June 2012, at 1, 1 (noting that the
adoption of the Military Rules of Evidence was driven by the codification of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975); Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American
Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine form Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 757–66, 809–10 (2003) (discussing the codification movement
in criminal law); Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s
Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098 passim (1978) (tracing the movement in the
United Kingdom and the United States from Jeremy Bentham’s writings in the nineteenth
century).
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steps to engraft civilian due process standards on the military justice
system.152
Finally, Department of Defense and military lawyers have played an
increasingly important role in crafting policies and procedures which
reflect concern about ensuring that the military justice system does not
become simply a system of discipline.153
Regardless of the reasons for the shift, the foregoing themes present
a somewhat abstract view of the military justice conundrum. Terms such
as “indispensible,” “delicate balance,” “justice,” and even the term
“discipline” are abbreviated sound bites or metaphors that might be used
in any discussion about military justice. But there are other ways of
analyzing and answering the conundrum.
V. The Crime Control and Due Process Models’ Approach to the
Conundrum
A. In General
In analyzing the military justice conundrum, it is helpful to draw
from those commentators who have conducted similar analyses of the
civilian criminal justice system. One of the leading commentators on this
subject is Professor Herbert L. Packer, who constructed two models for
analyzing the purposes and functions of a criminal justice system.154 In
152

See LURIE, supra note 89, at 247 (noting that Chief Judge Fletcher had stated in an
interview with the Army Times in November 1977 that the Court of Military Appeals
was interested in civilianizing military justice); Major Andrew W. Flor, Post-Trial Delay:
The Möbius Strip Path, ARMY LAW., June 2011, at 4, 7–9 (noting that in the late 1970s,
the Court of Military Appeals began sua sponte dismissing cases with prejudice if the
convening authority took more than ninety days after conviction to take action, so as to
enforce constitutional speedy trial rights).
153
See Cooke, supra note 120, at 6 (noting that armed forces lawyers “have the
responsibility to manage and mold the system so that it serves the needs and expectations
of the American people and their sons and daughters in the armed forces”); Eugene
Fidell, The Culture of Change in Military Law, 126 MIL. L. REV. 125, 130–31 (1989)
(commenting on key role of armed forces lawyers in effecting change in the military
justice system); Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, Today’s Military Advocates: The
Challenge of Fulfilling Our Nation’s Expectations for a Military Justice System That Is
Fair and Just, 195 MIL. L. REV. 190, 198 (2008) (commenting on roles of armed forces
lawyers).
154
Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
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his view, the two models reflect the competing perspectives at play in
such legal systems.155
Packer believed that it was necessary, in his words, to “build a
model” to better assess the potential for change in the criminal justice
system and predict its probable direction. To do so, he explained, would
move from the abstract to reality.156
The first model is the crime control model, which prioritizes the
ability, and need, of the government to prohibit specified conduct.157 The
second is the due process model. It upholds those attributes of the system
which serve as a check on the ability of the government to investigate,
charge, and try those accused of criminal conduct.158 One commentator
has described Packer’s two models as follows:
Both models describe a set of values, beliefs, attitudes,
and ideas about our criminal justice system that are held
by many legal actors within the system and that are
reflected in some of its institutions and practices. Both
models are prescriptive as well as descriptive. They
make competing normative claims about the validity of
procedural functions and the relative weight that should
be attached to valid procedural objectives when they
conflict with each other. Finally, both ideologies have
programmatic content because they suggest doctrinal
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. J. 185, 209–13 (1983) (providing a
critique and reconstruction of Professor Packer’s models). In reconstructing Professor
Packer’s models, Professor Arenella states that they create an erroneous impression that
criminal procedure is concerned solely with whether the government or the individual
should get the advantage in an adversarial proceeding. Id. at 211. See also HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). Professor Packer’s law review
article, and later book, were an attempt to provide some perspective on the Supreme
Court decisions under Chief Justice Warren. Professor Arenella’s work “reconstructed”
Packer’s two models in addressing the decisions of the Court under Chief Justice Burger.
See also John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 360–67 (1970) (examining Packer’s prevailing
ideology of criminal procedure); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151,
158 (1980) (criticizing the Warren and Burger Courts for being erratic in applying
criminal procedure doctrines), reprinted at 10 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 151.
155
Packer, supra note 154, at 5.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 9–10.
158
Id. at 13–14.
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courses of action that would implement their vision of
how the process should function. Consequently, both
ideological models provide a source for legitimate
arguments that courts may use to shape legal doctrine in
criminal procedure.159
The following discussion briefly describes the key features of
Packer’s two models, which can then be used to analyze the military
justice conundrum. The crime control model translates into the discipline
component of the military justice system. The due process model
translates into the justice component.
B. The Crime Control (Discipline) Model
The crime control model views the most important function of the
criminal process to be the repression of criminal conduct.160 The model
puts a premium on the speed and efficiency with which the process
operates to punish the guilty.161 Packer describes efficiency as “the
system’s capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high
proportion of criminal offenders whose offenses become known.”162
To be efficient and speedy in a system that lacks sufficient resources
to deal with the vast number of cases that must pass through it, the crime
control model prefers the informal, ex parte, administrative fact-finding
of the police and prosecutor to the more cumbersome adversarial
determination of guilt at trial.163 The model trusts government officials to
screen out the “probably innocent.”164 The screening process operated by
police and prosecutors is considered a reliable indicator of probable guilt.
Those not screened out are presumptively guilty.165

159

Arenella, supra note 154, at 189–90. Professor Arenella states, however, that while
Packer's models identify some of the values furthered by trial adjudication and plea
bargaining, neither model identifies the specific functions of American criminal
procedure nor fully explains how these functions would be served or thwarted by a “due
process” or “crime control” value perspective. Id. at 211.
160
Packer, supra note 154, at 9.
161
Id. at 10.
162
Id.
163
Id. Packer writes that under this model, “The process must not be cluttered with
ceremonious rituals that do not advance the progress of a case.” Id.
164
Id. at 11.
165
Id.
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Once a person has been arrested and investigated without being
found to be probably innocent, or, to put it differently, once a
determination has been made (by police and prosecutors) that there is
enough evidence of guilt to permit holding him for further action, then
all subsequent activity directed toward him is based on the view that he
is probably guilty. This “presumption of guilt” approach, according to
Professor Packer, allows the Crime Control Model to deal efficiently
with large numbers.166 Professor Packer argues that “presumption of
guilt” in this model is not the opposite of “presumption of innocence.”
What he calls the “presumption of guilt” is a factual judgment about
what probably happened (based on implicit trust of government
officials). The presumption of innocence, by contrast, is a rule that does
not depend on probabilities, but requires the accused to be treated as
innocent until he has been adjudged otherwise. Thus, the presumption of
innocence directs the government on how to proceed in a case, whereas
the presumption of guilt predicts the outcome.167
In the military setting, the discipline component takes on attributes
similar to Professor Packer’s crime control model. The military’s
screening process generally reflects a desire to expedite investigations of
alleged misconduct168 and is thorough enough that if the evidence against
a servicemember is weak, the command is not likely to begin courtmartial procedures. Instead, a commander may choose any number of
options for dealing with the issue outside the military justice arena.169
C. The Due Process (Justice) Model
Packer's due process model concentrates on the problem of how best
to limit official power over the individual.170 He refers to this model as

166

Id.
Id.
168
See, e.g., Mitsie Smith, Adding Force Behind Military Sexual Assault Reform: The
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Ending Military Sexual Assault, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER,
L. & SOC. POL’Y 147, 153 (2011) (stating the “essence of military justice is swift
punishment to ensure discipline”).
169
Schlueter supra note 20, § 1-8, at 48, discusses various options available to the
commander. These include taking no action or administrative action, and “administrative
action” covers everything from a verbal counseling through extra training to
administrative reduction in rank or separation from the service. See also MCM, supra
note 17, R.C.M. 306(c)(1), (2).
170
Packer, supra note 154, at 14.
167
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an “obstacle course.”171 This preoccupation with limiting government
power reflects the due process model’s concern with “the primacy of the
individual,” the stigma of the criminal sanction, and the possibilities of
abuse inherent in official power.172
The concern with government power and its abuses explains why the
due process model uses the criminal process to police itself by its formal
commitment to the concept of “legal guilt.”173 Packer explains:
According to this doctrine, an individual is not to be held
guilty of crime merely on a showing that in all
probability, based upon reliable evidence, he did
factually what he is said to have done. Instead, he is to
be held guilty if and only if these factual determinations
are made in procedurally regular fashion and by
authorities acting within competencies duly allocated to
them. Furthermore, he is not to be held guilty, even
though the factual determination is or might be adverse
to him, if various rules designed to safeguard the
integrity of the process are not given effect.174
The due process model prefers adversarial adjudication to an
administrative determination of guilt for two reasons. First, trial
adjudication is seen as a more reliable fact-finding mechanism. Second,
the police and prosecutor lack the competence and willingness to apply
factual guilt-disabling doctrines when they make their administrative
determination of guilt.175
The due process model limits government power over all suspects,
including the factually guilty, by forcing the state to prove its case in an
adjudicative forum that will provide maximum protection to the factually
innocent and maximum assurance that the state has respected the
171

Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
173
Id. See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (rejecting argument that
because evidence showed the defendant was clearly guilty, he could not complain of a
lack of due process; “[n]o matter what the evidence was against him, he had the right to
an impartial judge”).
174
Packer, supra note 154, at 16. Professor Packer lists the various rules as including
jurisdiction, venue, statute of limitations, double jeopardy, and criminal responsibility
(i.e., the defendant must not be insane or underage). Id. at 16–17.
175
Id. at 15.
172
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defendant's rights in securing its evidence and proving its case.176
In the military context, the concept of a justice or a justice-based
system describes this model.177 It generally reflects a distrust of a
commander’s powers and recognition of the potential for abuse. Under
Packer’s approach, the procedural protections available to a
servicemember charged with a crime fall within this model. The
“justice” approach to military justice might better be referred to as the
“due process” approach—the latter term better describes what is really at
stake. However, this article will continue to apply the term “justice,” as
that is the term usually used in discussing military criminal procedures.
D. Summary of the Models
The following chart provides a summary of the two models for
analyzing the military justice conundrum.

Crime Control—Discipline

Due Process—Justice

Efficient and Speedy

Efficiency Not Critical

Factual Guilt

Legal Guilt

Nonadversarial Procedures

Adversarial Procedures

Trust Government to Screen

Limits on Government’s Function in
Acting as Screener

Primacy of Public Interest

Primacy of Individual

E. Application of the Models to the Military Justice System
The following discussion applies the foregoing models to the current
military justice system. The first section focuses on those features of the
system that reflect concern about maintaining discipline. The second

176

Id. at 14.
In fact, we might better refer to it as the due process model—it better describes what is
really at stake.
177
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section focuses on those features that reflect concern about providing
justice.
Not every aspect of military justice is addressed here. This
discussion focuses on those features that are most readily identified with
one model or the other. Even so, it will be apparent that some features,
like the military’s guilty plea procedures, reflect both models.
1. Features That Reflect the Crime-Control-Discipline Model
a. In General
From the beginning, the Articles of War and then the UCMJ focused
on the military commander’s ability to maintain good order and
discipline by imposing disciplinary measures on members of their
command. The primary vehicle was trial by court-martial. Military law
now also includes more informal measures, such as nonjudicial
punishment under Article 15.
The Code contains several features that reflect the crime controldiscipline model.
b. Court-Martial Personal Jurisdiction
Normally, in applying the crime control and due process models,
commentators focus on the procedural aspects of criminal justice
systems. But the fact that Congress has provided for court-martial
jurisdiction over a wide range of individuals, including civilians,178
178

UCMJ art. 2(a)(10) (2012). In 2006, Congress amended Article 2 to provide for courtmartial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field, during times of war or contingency operations. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J.
256, 263–65 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (detailing how the accused was a non-US citizen, civilian
interpreter, working in Iraq for the military; he was court-martialed for committing the
offenses of false official statement, wrongful appropriation, and impeding an
investigation in the field during Operation Iraqi Freedom). See generally Lieutenant
Colonel Charles T. Kirchmaier, Command Authority Over Contractors Serving with or
Accompanying the Force, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2009, at 35, 39–41 (examining command
authority over contractors); Major Joseph R. Perlak, The Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Implications for Contractor Personnel, 169 MIL. L. REV. 92,
105–06 (2001) (noting that under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,
Department of Defense personnel may arrest civilians for crimes committed in certain
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reflects the crime control model in the UCMJ and the ability of the
commander to regulate and if necessary, punish, behavior that is
considered a threat to good order and discipline. Just within the last
decade Congress has taken steps to fill what it perceived to be
jurisdictional gaps.179 Thus, rather than restricting the commander’s
authority to enforce crime control within his or her area of operations,
Congress has actually expanded that authority180—thus rejecting civil
libertarian arguments that civilians should not be subjected to courtmartial jurisdiction.
c. Defining Military Offenses
Perhaps one of the most striking features of the current military
justice system is in the substantive law aspects of the UCMJ. Articles 77
through 134 are considered the “punitive articles”181 and proscribe
criminal offenses.
The punitive articles include offenses that are clearly related to good
order and discipline, such as disobedience of orders,182 desertion,183

areas, and a commander has considerable discretion about whether to turn these civilians
over to foreign authorities).
179
UCMJ art. 2(a)(10) (2012) (jurisdiction over civilians); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267
(offenses committed overseas).
180
See Katherin J. Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ Criminal
Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1059–67 (2010)
(recommending that military law should be used to hold private civilian contractors
criminally accountable under UCMJ); Matthew Dahl, “Runaway Train”: Controlling
Crimes Committed by Private Contractors Through Application of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 14 BARRY L. REV. 55, 77 (2010) (endorsing amendment to Article
2(a)(10), UCMJ, as necessary for controlling crimes committed by private contractors
and other civilians accompanying U.S. armed forces overseas); David A. Schlueter,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction: An Expansion of the Least Possible Power, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 74, 78–80 (1982) (discussing 1979 amendment to Article 2, UCMJ,
codifying doctrine of constructive enlistments); Cf. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing
Discipline to the Civilianization of the Battlefield: A Proposal for a More Legitimate
Approach to Resurrecting Military-Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilian Augmentees, 62
U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 491, 497–98 (2008) (arguing that military’s interests did not justify
extension of jurisdiction over civilians by Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of
2000 and amendment to Article 2a(10), UCMJ).
181
See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, CHARLES H. ROSE, VICTOR HANSEN & CHRISTOPHER
BEHAN, MILITARY CRIMES AND DEFENSES, § 3-1[5], at 50 (2d ed. 2012).
182
UCMJ art. 92 (2012).
183
Id. art. 85 (2012).
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disrespect,184 insubordination,185 and mutiny.186 The military-related
offenses also include the sometimes maligned general articles—Articles
133 and 134. These articles epitomize the discipline-crime control
model of criminal law, because they hold a servicemember criminally
responsible for actions that are not always specifically proscribed by
law.187 The military courts have held, however, that an accused must
have been on fair notice that his actions violated a statute, regulation, or
even custom of the service.188
The UCMJ also includes civilian offenses such as murder,189
robbery,190 and forgery.191 The Supreme Court has abolished its prior
“service connection” test, and held that the military can punish any
violation of the UCMJ—just as long as the accused is personally subject
to its jurisdiction.192 While the nexus between the commander’s ability
to punish a servicemember for violating a lawful order and the need to
maintain discipline is more readily apparent, the same nexus often exits
when a “civilian” offense is involved, and the commander does not need
to demonstrate that it does in order to exercise his or her jurisdiction.

184

Id. art. 86 (2012).
Id. art. 91 (2012).
186
Id. art. 94 (2012).
187
Thus, in United States v. Sadinsky, 34 C.M.R. 343, 345–46 (C.M.A. 1964), the Court
of Military Appeals upheld a conviction for jumping from the deck of an aircraft carrier
into the sea—conduct that had not been specifically proscribed either by law or
regulation. “To superimpose a requirement that the conduct be prohibited by some order,
regulation, or statute in order to fall within the proscription of . . . Article 134 would be
contrary to the clear and fair meaning of its terms.” Id. at 346. Afterwards, the President
added “Jumping from Vessel into the Water” as an enumerated offense under Article 134.
MCM, supra note 17, at A23–24.
188
See SCHLUETER, ROSE, HANSEN & BEHAN, supra note 181, § 7-3[3][c][i] (discussing
requirement that accused must be on fair notice that his conduct is chargeable as a
violation of Article 134).
189
UCMJ, art. 118 (2012).
190
Id. art. 122.
191
Id. art. 123. The process of adding “civilian-type” offenses to military law was a
gradual one. The Articles of War did not cover “civilian-type” crimes until 1863, and the
process of including them was not complete until the UCMJ was adopted in 1951. Thus,
under the Articles of War, murder and rape cases could not be tried at court-martial if the
crime was alleged to have happened in the American homeland during peacetime.
Sherman, supra note 9, at 39.
192
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 451 (1987), overruling O’Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
185
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Consider the following examples193:

193



First, the servicemember is charged with throwing butter
onto the ceiling of a mess hall, a violation of Article 134.194
At first blush this offense seems so trivial to be ignored.
Yet, commanders are constantly faced with minor delicts
that threaten the good order and discipline of a unit and
could, if left unaddressed, lead to additional delicts and a
lack of respect for command authority. It is important to note
that although this offense, standing alone, would normally
not give rise to a court-martial, at its core, the commander
should have the authority to take disciplinary action, whether
it be in the form of a reprimand, nonjudicial punishment, or a
court-martial.



Second, a servicemember is charged under Article 118 with
killing servicemembers and civilians at an off-base
convenience store.195 The command’s interest in crime
control is clear in this instance. But the command also must
have the authority to deal with this horrific offense under the
UCMJ. Servicemembers are involved and the need to
maintain good order may depend heavily on how the
command handles the killings.196



Third, a civilian contractor, working overseas for the
military, is charged with sexual assault of a servicemember
under Article 120.197 As noted supra, in 2006, Congress
amended Article 2 of the UCMJ to provide for court-martial
jurisdiction over “persons serving with or accompanying an
armed force in the field” during “contingency operations.”

It is assumed in these examples that the military has appropriate personal and subjectmatter jurisdiction over the servicemember.
194
See United States v. Regan, 11 M.J. 745 (A.C.M.R. 1981). In Regan, the accused was
charged with various offenses, including throwing butter onto the mess hall ceiling. The
court concluded that the specification alleging the behavior failed to include the requisite
words of criminality, e.g., failure to allege that the accused’s conduct was “disorderly.”
Interestingly, the court did not conclude that the accused’s actions could not be
considered a violation of the UCMJ.
195
UCMJ art. 118 (2012).
196
Even assuming the command has a very high interest in handling a murder case, there
may be an existing agreement with local authorities that requires that all murders be
handled in the state or federal courts.
197
UCMJ, art. 120 (2012).
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Congress apparently believed that the need to control
criminal activity by civilians accompanying the military was
important enough to entrust that power to do so in a military
commander.


Finally, a servicemember is charged with violating a nocontact order under Article 92.198 This offense, while raising
issues of the ability of a commander to infringe on a
servicemember’s liberty interests,199 reflects the view that in
order to maintain good order and discipline, even if not
strictly criminal activity, a commander should be able to
order a servicemember to avoid contact which might in turn
lead to criminal activity or other threats to the unit.

In each of the foregoing examples, the Congress has recognized that
it is critical that the commander have the ability to address a wide range
of misconduct—some of which would not be a crime in a civilian
setting—in order to maintain good order and discipline.
d. Role of the Commander
The commander’s role in military justice perhaps best reflects the
crime control and discipline model, and prevents it from being viewed as
a truly justice-based system. Critics and supporters of military justice
have one thing in common. They recognize the pivotal role of the
commander as a feature that distinguishes the military and civilian
systems of criminal justice.200 This role reflects the broad trust in the

198

Id. art. 92.
See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 13-3(O)(5), at 728–32 (discussing rights of privacy
in the military setting).
200
Weiss v. United States, 510 U. S. 163, 175 (1994) (listing the powers of the military
commander and concluding that “by contrast to civilian society, nonjudicial military
officers play a significant part in the administration of military justice”). See generally
Alleman, supra note 97; Brigadier General Paul R. Dordal, The Military Criminal Justice
System: A Commander’s Perspective, THE REPORTER, June 1997, at 3; Hansen, supra
note 145, at 423 (“First and foremost, military justice is one of the primary tools a
military commander has to maintain discipline within the ranks.” But “it is not the be all
and end all of military justice, particularly in a democracy.”); William Westmoreland,
Military Justice—A Commander’s Viewpoint, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 5 (1971).
199
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judgment of government officials that characterizes the crime control
model.201
A brief review of the commander’s broad powers makes the point.
First, the commander has very broad discretion to conduct investigations
into allegations of misconduct.202 The actual investigations are almost
always conducted either by the law enforcement branches of the armed
forces, who in turn report their findings to the commander, or by
investigating officers appointed by the commander himself. The
commander’s powers include the authority to authorize searches and
seizures, conduct inspections, and question suspects. While the
commander’s authority to do so is limited by the MCM and judicial
opinions, the power is nonetheless broad and reflective of the crime
control and discipline models.
Second, the commander has broad prosecutorial discretion.203
Commanders, not lawyers, ultimately decide whether to take
administrative actions, impose nonjudicial punishment, or commence
court-martial proceedings. If a commander, after receiving legal advice
and the advice and recommendations of subordinate commanders,
decides to convene a court-martial, the commander personally selects the
members of the court-martial panel.204 This controversial feature of the
military justice system draws support,205 criticism,206 and calls for
201

In Professor Packer’s formulation, these officials may be police or prosecutors; in
military justice, they are commanders.
202
See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 5-2, at 265–66.
203
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361, 365 (C.M.A. 1983) (stating the
“convening authority . . . is free to decide the number of offenses to charge . . .”); United
States v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1987) (noting that courts are hesitant to review
decisions whether to prosecute; there is a strong presumption that convening authorities
perform their function without bias); See also SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 6-1[A], at
355–61 (discussing commander’s discretion).
204
UCMJ art. 25 (2012). Timothy W. Murphy, A Defense of the Role of the Convening
Authority: The Integration of Justice and Discipline, 28 THE REPORTER No. 3, at 3
(2001). The composition of the court-martial panel itself, quite aside from the
commander’s role in choosing it, manifests the crime control model. The panel always
consists of servicemembers senior to the accused, whether officers or enlisted. If the
accused requests that enlisted members be appointed to the court, the convening authority
appoints noncomissioned officers from the command. Thus, regardless of whether the
case is judge alone or panel, the accused’s fate is decided by government officials (in the
form of military leaders), and not by private citizens. Because the crime control model
includes “trust in the judgment of government officials” the composition issue is a
manifestation of that model.
205
See Christopher Behan, Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape: In Defense of Convening
Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. REV.
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reform.207 One popular proposal is to adopt a random system of selecting
the members.208 Nonetheless, the system remains intact. Third, after the
court-martial is convened, the commander may decide such questions as
to whether to grant immunity to witnesses, and whether to provide
witnesses and expert assistance to the defense.209 Again, although those
190 (2003) (offering a strong defense for the current system of selecting court members);
Charles W. Schiesser, Trial by Peers: Enlisted Members on Courts-Martial, 15 CATH. U.
L. REV. 171 (1966) (stating the system is an ethical and pragmatic success).
206
Major Guy P. Glazier, He Called for His Pipe, and He Called for His Bowl, and He
Called for His Members Three—Selection of Military Juries by the Sovereign:
Impediment to Military Justice, 157 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (criticizing process).
207
See Major R. Rex Brookshire, Juror Selection Under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice: Fact and Fiction, 58 MIL. L. REV. 71 (1972) (proposing reforms); Frank J.
Chmelik, The Military Justice System and the Right to Trial by Jury: Size and Voting
Requirements of the General Court-Martial for Service-Connected Civilian Offenses, 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 617 (1981) (discussing Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
should apply for non-military offenses); Victor M. Hansen, Avoiding the Extremes: A
Proposal for Modifying Court Member Selection in the Military, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV.
911 (2011) (proposing a change to the military’s panel selection system by using the
accused’s peremptory challenges to address the unfairness of stacking a court-martial
panel); Major James T. Hill, Applying Transparency in the Military Panel Selection
Process with the Preselection Method, 205 MIL. L. REV. 117 (2010) (recommending new
system for selecting members); Major Stephen A. Lamb, The Court-Martial Panel
Selection Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103 (1992) (proposing reforms);
Daniel Maurer, The Unrepresentative Military Jury: Deliberate Inclusion of Combat
Veterans in the Military’s Venire for Combat-Incidental Crimes, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
803 (2009) (recommending greater inclusion of combat servicemembers in cases
involving combat-related charges); Major Gary C. Smallridge, The Military Jury
Selection Reform Movement, 19 A.F. L. REV. 343 (1977) (discussing proposed reforms);
Dwight W. Sullivan, Playing the Numbers Game: Court-Martial Panel Size and the
Military Death Penalty, 158 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (proposing changes).
208
See Matthew J. McCormack, Reforming Court-Martial Panel Selection: Why Change
Makes Sense for Military Commanders and Military Justice, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013
(1999) (recommending adoption of random selection process); Joseph Remcho, Military
Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47 IND. L.J. 193 (1973)
(concluding that there would be little or no loss to discipline if the military adopted a
random process of selecting members); Captain John D. VanSant, Trial by Jury of
Military Peers, 15 A.F. L. REV. 185 (1973) (proposing random selection); Colonel James
A. Young, Revising the Court-Martial Selection Process, 163 MIL. L. REV. 91 (2000)
(recommending random selection process).
209
However, a military judge may order the Government to provide expert assistance
even if the commander refuses, and under Rule for Courts-Martial 703 may enforce the
order with abatement if the Government refuses. See Major Dan Dalrymple, Make the
Most of It: How Defense Counsel Needing Expert Assistance Can Access Existing
Government Resources, ARMY LAW., May 2013, at 35, 35 & n.6. A military judge may
also order the live production of other witnesses, even if it is not militarily convenient for
the commander to produce them. United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 610–11
(N.M.C.M.R. 1990); United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94, 95–96 (C.M.A. 1977).
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decisions are subject to judicial review, the commander’s authority to be
involved in that process is broad.
Finally, commanders have broad post-trial powers and duties.
Following a court-martial conviction, the commander who convened the
court-martial is charged with, among other things, reviewing the results,
considering any post-trial clemency matters the servicemember may have
submitted, and deciding whether to approve the findings and the
sentence.210
A commander’s broad powers can lead to serious problems if a
commander unlawfully exercises influence on the system. As noted
above, the crime control model places trust in the ability of law
enforcement personnel and prosecutors to efficiently and speedily
resolve alleged criminal activity. While the military justice systems place
some trust in the commanders to function similarly, unfettered discretion
and power can tempt the commander to “fix” the outcome of a case
being processed in the system. To that end, Article 37 of the UCMJ
expressly forbids commanders, and others, from exercising unlawful
influence on a case.211 And Article 98 makes it an offense to not
promptly dispose of charges or to enforce any provision in the UCMJ.212
Unlawful command influence is considered the “mortal enemy of
military justice,”213 and the authorities that establish it check the
commander’s power in accordance with the due process model of
criminal law. However, in general, the commander’s broad discretion is
a “crime control” rather than a “due process” feature of military justice.
Ultimately, it is the commanders, not the lawyers or the judges, who
are responsible for good order and discipline in the Armed Forces.

210

The system recognizes that at the end of the day, the case goes back to where it
started—on the commander's desk: To ensure that the system works.
211
UCMJ art. 37 (2012).
212
Id. art. 98.
213
United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986). See generally SCHLUETER,
supra note 20, § 6-3, at 387–15 (discussing command influence).
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e. Nonjudicial Punishment
Another feature that clearly reflects the crime control-discipline
model is Article 15 of the UCMJ.214 That provision authorizes
commanders to impose nonjudicial punishment on members of their
commands for minor offenses.215 The Supreme Court has recognized
these procedures as administrative in nature216 and Congress has
recognized that using nonjudicial punishment reduces the number of
courts-martial for minor offenses that affect discipline.217
Under Professor Packer’s crime control model, administrative
procedures in a criminal justice system can efficiently and quickly
dispose of criminal allegations and reduce the need for adversarial
proceedings.218 Nonjudicial punishment procedures fit hand-in-glove
with that model. Because of their summary nature—where only minimal
due process is provided219—nonjudicial punishment procedures have
been challenged as being unconstitutional.220
214

UCMJ art. 15 (2012). Various terms are used for this procedure. In the Air Force and
Army, it is referred to as an “Article 15,” in the Coast Guard and Navy, “Captain’s
Mast,” and in Marine Corps, “Office Hours.” See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, §§ 3-5(A),
3-5(C), 3-5(D), and 3-5(E).
215
See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 3 (discussing nonjudicial punishment
procedures in the armed forces); Captain Harold L. Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28
MIL. L. REV. 37 (1965) (reviewing the history of nonjudicial punishment and discussing
the fact that it is a much-needed disciplinary tool). See also Burress M. Carnahan,
Comment—Article 15 Punishments, 13 A.F. JAG L. REV. 270 (1971) (discussing Air
Force Article 15 procedures); Dwight Sullivan, Overhauling the Vessel Exception, 43
NAVAL L. REV. 57 (1996) (discussing extensively the vessel exception).
216
See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 31–31 (1976) (stating that nonjudicial
punishment is an administrative method of dealing with minor offenses).
217
See S. REP. NO. 1911, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2379,
2380–82:
Article 15 . . . provides a means whereby military
commanders may impose nonjudicial punishment for minor
infractions of discipline. Its use permits the services to
reduce substantially the number of courts-martial for minor
offenses, which result in stigmatizing and impairing the
efficiency and morale of the person concerned.
Id.

218

Packer, supra note 154, at 13. Professor Packer’s thesis is that unencumbered
administrative fact-finding, similar to a guilty plea, can reduce adjudicative proceedings.
Id.
219
Each of the services provide guidance to commanders on imposing nonjudicial
punishment. In each service, to one degree or another, a servicemember receives notice of
the pending proceeding, the right to consult with an attorney, a nonadversarial hearing
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f. Guilty Pleas
In developing his two models for analyzing the criminal justice
system, Professor Packer highlighted plea bargaining and guilty pleas as
a prime example of the crime control model. In his view, the desire to
use the criminal justice system to control crime was best reflected in the
ability of the system to deal quickly and efficiently by permitting a
defendant to plead guilty. He writes:
The pure Crime Control Model has very little use for
many conspicuous features of the adjudicative process
and in real life works a number of ingenious
compromises with it. Even in the pure model, however,
there have to be devices for dealing with the suspect
after the preliminary screening process has resulted in a
determination of probable guilt. The focal device, as we
shall see, is the plea of guilty; through its use
adjudicative fact-finding is reduced to a minimum. It
might be said of the Crime Control Model that, reduced
to its barest essentials and when operating at its most
successful pitch, it consists of two elements: (a) an
administrative fact-finding process leading to
exoneration of the suspect, or to (b) the entry of a plea of
guilty.221
Critics of this view point out that Professor Packer’s recognition of
the finality and efficiency of plea bargaining and guilty pleas does not
demonstrate that guilty pleas promote criminal law objectives any better
than trials.222

before the commander (conducted by the commander), the right to demand a trial in lieu
of the nonjudicial punishment (unless the servicemember is attached to embarked on, a
vessel), and the right to appeal the punishment to a superior commander.
220
See Note, The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481 (1973)
(taking position that servicemember faces dilemma of accepting punishment or
demanding trial where constitutional protections would be available); Edward J.
Imwinkelried & Francis A. Gilligan, The Constitutionality of Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83
YALE L.J. 534 (1974) (rejecting arguments that Article 15 procedures are
unconstitutional).
221
Packer, supra note 154, at 13. See also Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 316–17 (1983) (asserting that because of
variables in an adjudicary proceeding, trials cannot convey “truth” with regularity).
222
Arenella, supra note 154, at 216–17.
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Court-martial charges against servicemembers typically result in plea
bargaining between the commander and the accused and entry of a guilty
plea in return, for example, for a reduced charge or sentence.223 Thus, the
military’s practice of permitting plea bargaining and guilty pleas reflects
the crime control-discipline model. It permits the system to assign guilt,
sentence the offender, and send a signal to others in the command that
such conduct is not tolerated, with a minimum of administrative
difficulty (unless the Government is seeking the death penalty, in which
case a guilty plea is not allowed).
On the other hand, there are real dangers lurking in taking guilty
pleas from accused servicemembers who may not fully appreciate their
options or otherwise feel the pressure from the command to plead guilty.
To guard against coerced or uniformed guilty pleas, the military judge
must first conduct a full inquiry into the basis of the plea224 and an
inquiry into any pretrial agreement between the commander and the
accused.225 Those requirements are thus due process limits on a feature
of military justice which reflects the crime control-discipline model.
g. Nonunanimous Verdicts
In the military justice system, only a two-thirds vote of the courtmartial members is required to convict, unless the case is being tried as a
capital case.226 The verdict is set by the first vote of the members, which
is by secret written ballot.227 Thus, there are no hung juries in military
practice. This feature furthers the crime control-discipline model in two
ways. First, the prosecution need not convince all of the members of the
223

See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 9 (discussing pretrial agreements), ch. 14
(discussing entry of guilty pleas).
224
United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969). This inquiry is referred to as the
Care providency inquiry. The “paternalistic” thoroughness of this process has been
criticized on the grounds that it places too great a burden on Military Judges and counsel
to extract all the necessary facts from the accused. Major Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea
Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?, 134 MIL. L. REV. 195, 240 (1991). This critique thus
represents a crime control-discipline response to a due process-justice practice,
advocating greater trust in the trial judge and fewer “formalities” before finding the
accused guilty.
225
United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453
(C.M.A. 1976).
226
UCMJ art. 52 (2012).
227
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 921(c). The MCM provides for procedures for
reconsideration of a verdict by the members. Id. R.C.M. 924.
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court-martial that an accused is guilty. Thus, the chances of a conviction
seem higher. Second, this rule reflects efficiency, one of the features of
the crime control model—even if the trial ends in an acquittal.
h. Sentencing
If an accused is convicted by a court-martial, either a military judge
or the court-martial members who found the accused guilty, decide the
sentence. The presentencing phase of trial typically happens immediately
after guilty findings are announced, on the same day or the next day;
there is no delay while presentencing reports are prepared or additional
evidence is gathered. The commander who sent the case to the courtmartial does not set the sentence. During sentencing, an accused is
permitted to introduce evidence in extenuation and mitigation, and may
make an unsworn statement. The type and amount of maximum
punishment that may be imposed are generally determined by the
jurisdictional limits of the court-martial involved228 the nature of the
proceeding,229 and limits spelled out in the MCM.230 The sentencing
authority’s discretion is otherwise unfettered; there are no “sentencing
guidelines” and (except in certain very serious cases) no mandatory
minimum sentences.231
In arguing for an appropriate sentence, the prosecution may make a
general deterrence argument—which reflects the commander’s interest in
deterring others in the command from engaging in the same sort of
behavior.232 However, as noted at Part V.E.2.i below, some features of
the sentencing process clearly reflect the due process approach.

228

SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 16-2(B) at 983-84 (discussing jurisdictional limits on
punishments).
229
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 810(d) (limits on punishments in rehearings, new trials,
and other trials).
230
Id. pt. IV. Part IV of the MCM lists the various punitive articles and the maximum
sentence that may be imposed for each offense. In addition, the MCM includes
“escalator” provisions. See id. R.C.M. 1003(d).
231
Colonel Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Court-Martial Sentencing With Members: A Shot in the
Dark?, 35 THE REPORTER 33, 34 (2008) (the minimum sentence for certain types of
murder is life; the minimum sentence for spying is death).
232
See United States v. Meeks, 41 M.J. 150, 158–59 (C.M.A. 1994) (holding prosecutor’s
argument was fair comment on preserving good order and discipline and general
deterrence). Deterrence is one of several utilitarian justifications for punishment. See
PACKER, supra note 154, at 39–45.
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2. Features That Reflect the Due Process-Justice Model
a. In General
As noted above, a number of commentators have stated that the
current military justice system is justice based.233 While that point is
debatable, some features of the military justice system clearly reflect the
due process-justice model. The following discussion addresses
substantive and procedural protections.
b. Application of Bill of Rights Protections to Commander’s
Control of Servicemembers
A commander has considerable control over the lives of
servicemembers in his or her unit—a feature that reflects the crime
control-discipline model. But case law recognizes constitutional limits to
that control, for example, when a commander issues an order that
infringes on a servicemember’s freedom of speech234 or religion235 or a
servicemember’s privacy interests.236 Those limits reflect the due process
(substantive and procedural) justice model.
c. Application of the Bill of Rights Protections During Pretrial
Processing of Cases
During the pretrial investigation and processing of charges, an
accused benefits from a number of constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory protections. The Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination applies to any interrogations of a suspect or to any request
to produce incriminating information.237 The Fourth Amendment applies
to any search and seizure conducted by military or civilian authorities.238
And the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any eyewitness

233

See Part IV.D, supra.
SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 13-3(O)(4), at 717–28 (First Amendment rights).
235
Id. § 13-3(O)(4), at 724–25.
236
Id. § 13-3(O)(5), at 728–32.
237
U.S. CONST. amend V; MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 301. The privilege against
self-incrimination at court-martial is actually older than the Bill of Rights itself, and was
afforded to Major John André during his Revolutionary War trial for spying. United
States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249, 254 (1967).
238
U.S. CONST. amend IV; MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 311–17.
234
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identification procedures.239 In each of these areas, however, the courts
have recognized that the demands of good order and discipline may
prevail.240
d. Military Discovery Practices
The military’s pretrial discovery rules clearly reflect the due processjustice model.241 First, under Article 46, the accused has discovery rights
that equal those available to the prosecution. The accused is entitled to
compulsory process to obtain both military and defense witnesses,
sometimes at government expense.242 That might include obtaining
immunity for a defense witness.243 Second, an accused may request that
the government provide an expert consultant to assist the defense in
preparing its case244 and to testify at trial on behalf of the accused.245 If
an expert is assigned to assist the defense, that person becomes part of
the defense team.246 Third, the accused is entitled to have the prosecution
automatically disclose the following information: names and contact
information of prosecution witnesses,247 evidence which is favorable to
the accused,248 evidence of any prior convictions,249 and evidence of
239

U.S. CONST. amend VI; MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 321.
See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (“the rights of men in the armed
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and
duty”).
241
See generally Ronald S. Thompson, Constitutional Applications to the Military
Criminal Defendant, 66 U. DETROIT L. REV. 221 (1989) (noting that although
modifications have been made to substantive constitutional law rights, in order to
maintain good order and discipline, an accused servicemember has enhanced protections
in other areas such as discovery and witness production).
242
Francis A. Gilligan & Frederick Lederer, The Procurement and Presentation of
Evidence in Courts-Martial: Compulsory Process and Confrontation, 101 MIL. L. REV. 1
(1983); Major Calvin M. Lederer, Warrants of Attachment—Forcibly Compelling the
Attendance of Witnesses, 98 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
243
Major Steven W. Myhre, Defense Witness Immunity and the Due Process Standard: A
Proposed Amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 136 MIL. L. REV. 69 (1992).
244
United States v. Short, 50 M.J. 370 (C.A.A.F. 1999); Major Will A. Gunn,
Supplementing the Defense Team: A Primer on Requesting and Obtaining Expert
Assistance, 39 A.F. L. REV. 143 (1996).
245
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 703(d).
246
See SCHLUETER supra note 20, § 11-5, at 589–90 (noting that in that instance,
communications between the defense and expert consultant may be privileged).
247
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701.
248
Id. R.C.M. 701(a)(6); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
249
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(4).
240
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statements by the accused,250 evidence seized from the accused,251 and
evidence of any eyewitness identifications.252 Fourth, if the command
intends to convene a general court-martial to try an accused, it must first
hold an Article 32 hearing to determine if there is a basis for the
charges.253 During that hearing, which is sometimes equated with a
civilian grand jury,254 the accused is entitled to be present, to present
evidence, but perhaps more importantly, to hear the testimony of
witnesses who will likely testify against him at a later trial.255
Furthermore, even in a special court-martial, “[e]ach party shall have
adequate opportunity to prepare its case and equal opportunity to
interview witnesses and inspect evidence. No party may unreasonably
impede the access of another party to a witness or evidence.”256 Thus,
unlike in some civilian jurisdictions, the Government may not encourage
its witnesses to refuse to talk to the defense outside of court.257
In addition, an accused may request production of evidence and
information such as the results of any tests or reports,258 tangible
evidence and documents,259 Jencks Act materials,260 and sentencing
information.261
250

Id. MIL. R. EVID. 304(d)(1).
Id. MIL. R. EVID. 311(d)(1).
252
Id. MIL. R. EVID. 321(c)(1).
253
UCMJ art. 32 (2012). See generally Major Larry A. Gaydos, A Comprehensive Guide
to the Military Pretrial Investigation, 111 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1986) (discussing of Article
32 procedures); Brian C. Hayes, Strengthening Article 32 to Prevent Politically
Motivated Prosecution: Moving Military Justice Back to the Cutting Edge, 19 REGENT U.
L. REV. 173 (2006) (recommending that Congress revise Article 32 to require
independent establishment of probable cause); Lieutenant Colonel Timothy A. Murphy,
The Formal Pretrial Investigation, 12 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1961) (examining Article 32
procedures).
254
Lawrence J. Sandell, The Grand Jury and the Article 32: A Comparison, 1 N. KY. ST.
L.F. 25 (1973) (comparing Article 32 to grand jury).
255
See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 7-2(C), at 426–31 (discussing accused’s rights at
Article 32 investigation).
256
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(e).
257
See United States v. Irwin, 30 M.J. 87, 93–95 (C.M.A. 1990).
258
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(B).
259
Id. R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(A).
260
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). United States v. Jarrie, 5 M.J. 193 (C.M.A. 1978). See
generally Don Burnette, Workshopping the Jencks Act, ARMY LAW., June 1987, at 22;
First Lieutenant Stephen T. Lynch, Possession Under the Jencks Act, 10 A.F. JAG R. 177
(Dec. 1981); Major Orlan G. Waldrop, The Jencks Act, 20 A.F. L. REV. 93 (1978); Daniel
Bogart, Jencks Act, 27 JAG J. 427 (1973); Major Luther C. West, Significance of the
Jencks Act in Military Law, 30 MIL. L. REV. 83 (1965).
261
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(5)(A).
251
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These procedural protections strongly reflect the due process-justice
model in that they are designed to ensure that an accused has access to
any evidence which he may introduce on his behalf or which may be
introduced against him at trial by the prosecution.
e. Appointment and Role of Counsel
Throughout the military justice system, lawyers play a pervasive and
essential role. Their participation clearly reflects the due process-justice
model. Lawyers advise commanders at all levels of command, for
example on promulgation of lawful orders and policies, pretrial
investigations,262 decisions concerning prosecutorial discretion,
responding to defense requests, and post-trial disposition of courtsmartial.
On the defense side, lawyers represent the accused at virtually every
stage of the proceedings—from pretrial investigation to appellate review.
Defense counsel are typically assigned to separate legal chains of
command, so that they are not directly responsible to the local
commanders.263
The military system takes the role of counsel very seriously. The
appellate courts review, and act upon, allegations of unprofessional or
ineffective representation by both the prosecution264 and the defense.265
f. Use of Military Judges
Another feature of the military justice system that reflects the due
process-justice model is the appointment of military judges to preside
over courts-martial. Their role is critical in ensuring that the rules of
262

Although we usually focus on the appointment of defense counsel, the fact that the
system involves prosecutors at the early stage to advise commanders is also another
factor that, whether intended or not, could have justice implications for the defendant.
Lawyers can be effective in dissuading a commander from proceeding with baseless
charges that run the risk of demoralizing the command.
263
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE ch. 6 (3 Oct. 2011)
(discussing U.S. Army Trial Defense Service).
264
See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 13-3(N), at 704–08 (discussing prosecutorial
misconduct).
265
See id. § 15-2(C)(3), at 835–59 (discussing ineffective assistance of defense counsel).

2013]

MILITARY JUSTICE CONUNDRUM

67

procedure and evidence are applied and enforced. While the commander
can control what takes place outside the courtroom, it is the judge who is
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that an accused receives a fair
trial.
g. Guilty Plea Inquiries
As noted in Part V.E.1.f, above, the ability of the prosecution and
defense to efficiently resolve pending charges through entry of a guilty
plea—most often accompanied by a pretrial agreement—reflects the
crime control-discipline model. But there are concerns that the
government may coerce an accused into pleading guilty and thus waive
important constitutional rights that would be available in a contested
trial.266 To address that concern, the military courts and the MCM267
require the military judge to conduct an inquiry into the voluntariness
and factual basis of a guilty plea.268 In addition, the military judge is
required to determine if there is any agreement between the accused and
the commander and, if so, review the agreement to ensure that it
comports with law and sound policy.269 Failure to conduct the inquiry
may result in the guilty plea later set aside by an appellate court.270
Accordingly, the requirement to conduct these inquiries reflects the due
process-justice model.

266

See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The
Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978) (proposing a new rule
that would allow a defendant to issue proper notice of his constitutional claims, plead
guilty, and claim on appeal the violation of those rights); Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas,
93 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1980) (noting that conditional guilty pleas are an appropriate
compromise between the benefits of the plea bargain system and the need to provide
defendants with an adequate forum for the consideration of their constitutional claims).
267
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 910.
268
United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969). Cf. Elling, supra note 224
(recommending changing the law so that courts will not be always required to reject a
guilty plea whenever an inconsistency arises).
269
United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453
(C.M.A. 1976).
270
See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 35 M.J. 787 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (guilty plea
improvident where element of offense was missing).
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h. Trial Procedures
Virtually every aspect of a court-martial itself reflects the due
process-justice model. As outlined in Part II.B, supra, an accused is
entitled to the same protections and rights that exist in federal and state
criminal trials. The court-martial is an adversarial proceeding and is
designed, as is its civilian counterpart, to determine whether an accused
is guilty of the charged offense—both factually and legally.
While most courts-martial are conducted quickly and efficiently,
they sometimes reflect what Packer refers to as the “obstacles” of due
process. For example, a military accused is entitled to file motions to
dismiss, motions to suppress evidence, motions for appropriate relief,
and motions for continuances. The motions practice in the current
military justice system, in keeping with the due process-justice model,
can slow things down. For commanders and others who are concerned
about the good order and morale of the military community, the process
can sometimes be very frustrating—especially if the proceedings are
protracted.271
i. Sentencing
If an accused is convicted by a court-martial, either the military
judge or the court-martial members who found the accused guilty will
determine the sentence. During sentencing, the commander’s interest in
ensuring that the accused does not return to the command (the crime
control-discipline model) is restricted by two rules: First, prosecution
witnesses on sentencing are not permitted to testify that in their opinion
the accused should be discharged.272 Second, the prosecutor may not urge
the court or the military judge to impose a discharge as part of the
271

For example, the court-martial of Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood has drawn negative
comments from the surviving victims of that shooting. See, e.g., Jim Forsyth, Trial
Delays Vex Fort Hood Survivors Three Years Later, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2012,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-04/news/sns-rt-us-usa-crime-fort-hoodbre8a
403y-20121104_1_major-nidal-hasan-fort-hood-trial-delays.
272
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001(b)(5)(B); United States v. Ohrt, 28 M.J. 301
(C.M.A. 1989). This approach, which seems to reflect interests in the individual’s
rehabilitation versus the command’s interests, clearly fits Packer’s due process model.
The one thing the command might not want, because it could adversely affect good order
and discipline, is for a convicted servicemember to return to the unit. As a practical
matter, if a servicemember did not receive a punitive discharge, the command would
have the option of administratively separating that person. See also PACKER, supra note
154, at 53–58 (discussing rehabilitation as a justification for punishment).

2013]

MILITARY JUSTICE CONUNDRUM

69

sentence.273 In sentencing an accused, the court-martial or the military
judge may consider not only the impact of the accused’s actions on the
military community and any victims, but also the rehabilitative potential
of the accused.274 To that extent, military sentencing reflects the due
process-justice model.
Furthermore, Rule for Court-Martial 1001, which governs
presentencing procedures,275 is broadly asymmetrical in favor of the
defense. The Government is generally limited to evidence in aggravation
of the crimes of which the accused was convicted, plus evidence of prior
convictions and punishments, uncharged misconduct, information about
the victim, and a very limited form of testimony about the accused’s
rehabilitative potential.276 The Government is also bound by the Military
Rules of Evidence.277 The defense, in contrast, is allowed to introduce
nearly anything about the accused himself (as well as the crimes) that
may tend to reduce the punishment. The defense also has the option to
relax the rules of evidence,278 and if the convicted servicemember
chooses to make an unsworn statement, he is not only not subject to
cross-examination,279 but his “allocution” rights allow him to speak about
almost anything he wishes to try to influence his sentence.280
Once the accused has been sentenced, a commander may not
increase the punishment.281 The commander may, however, take action to
reduce282 or suspend the sentence.283

273

See, e.g., United States v. Motsinger, 34 M.J. 255 (C.M.A. 1992).
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001(b)(5).
275
Id. R.C.M. 1001.
276
Id. R.C.M. 1001(b)(5); see also Edward J. O’Brien, Rehabilitative Potential
Evidence—Theory and Practice, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2011, at 5, 11 & n.58 (calling into
question whether the “rehabilitative potential” evidence the Government may introduce is
ever really useful in enhancing a sentence).
277
MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001(c)(3), (d), and (3). See also MCM, supra note 17,
MIL. R. EVID. 1101.
278
Id. R.C.M. 1001(c)(3). If the judge has relaxed the rules of evidence for the defense,
the prosecution may request that the rules of evidence be relaxed for any rebuttal
evidence. Id.
279
Id. R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(C).
280
Id. R.C.M. 1001(c)(2).
281
Id. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1).
282
Id. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1).
283
Id. R.C.M. 1108.
274
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j. Appellate Review of Court-Martial Convictions
Finally, the one feature of the military justice system that perhaps
best reflects the due process-justice model is the system’s appellate
review of courts-martial.284 The system of appellate review is sometimes
described as “paternalistic,” a reference to the view that the crime
control-discipline model may lead to incorrect results (at the command
level) and that the appellate courts can correct such results.
As noted in Part II.C, above, court-martial convictions can be
appealed to the relevant service’s Court of Criminal Appeals,285 and
review by that court is automatic in certain cases.286 An adverse decision
by those courts may be reviewed by the CAAF.287 And that court’s
decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States.288
This system ensures that whatever may have occurred at the command
level, appellate courts (both military and civilian) can review a courtmartial conviction to ensure that the conviction comports with the
Constitution, the UCMJ, and the MCM.
Within that structure are sub-elements that further the due processjustice model. First, the accused is entitled to representation by a military
appellate attorney at no cost to the accused.289 Second, the service
appellate courts have independent fact-finding powers which provide a
convicted servicemember with an opportunity to argue that the
conviction should be set aside because the evidence was insufficient.290
Occasionally a court-martial conviction is reversed on those grounds.291
Third, in reviewing court-martial convictions, the appellate courts
apply standards of review similar to those used in civilian courts.292
Fourth, the service appellate courts have the power to review and, if
284

See generally Daniel T. Ghent, Military Appellate Process, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 125
(1971) (reviewing the military appellate process).
285
UCMJ art. 66(a) (2012). The Judge Advocate General of each service must establish a
Court of Criminal Appeals.
286
A case must be referred to the service’s court of criminal appeals if the sentence
includes death, a punitive discharge, or confinement of one year or more. Id. art. 66(b).
287
Id. art. 67.
288
Id. art. 67 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012).
289
UCMJ art. 70 (2012).
290
Id. art. 66(c) (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1203(b) discussion.
291
See, e.g., United States v. McDuffie, 65 M.J. 631 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2007)
(evidence insufficient to sustain conviction).
292
See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 17-14, at 1166–75 (discussing standards of review).
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necessary, to reassess the sentence.293 In doing so, they may consider
sentences adjudged in similar cases.294 Fifth, the appellate courts may
return the case to the trial level for a hearing on a specified issue.295 And
finally, the CAAF has used its review powers to conclude that a
particular statute or provision is not enforceable.296
3. Summary of Application of the Models
While application of the crime control-discipline model and the due
process-justice model to features of the military justice system is
instructive, there seems to be no way to objectively determine how the
two models fit together, or relate to each other. And one cannot simply
add up the features that appear to reflect each model and come to a
conclusion about whether one or the other predominates. At the most,
they can provide some insight into how courts and commentators view
one or more features of the system. In themselves they do not resolve the
conundrum.
VI. The Primary Purpose Approach to the Conundrum
While the thematic approach297 and the models approach298 help in
identifying the competing ideologies and approaches to the conundrum,
neither approach provides a satisfactory answer to the core question:
What is the primary purpose of the military justice system? The answer
usually depends on one’s ideological approach to the purposes of any
criminal justice system. The models approach identifies and explores the
different ideologies. The thematic approach reflects the writer’s “sound
bite” views on those ideologies.

293

MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1203(b) Discussion.
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 15 M.J. 948 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (in some cases
comparing sentences is appropriate); Cf. Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Stone Weber,
Sentence Appropriateness Relief in the Courts of Criminal Appeals, 66 A.F. LAW. REV. 79
(2010) (suggesting that comparing sentences leads to inconsistent results).
295
United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A. 1967). See also Andrew Effron,
United States v. Dubay and the Evolution of Military Law, 207 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2011)
(discussing the history and application of DuBay hearings).
296
See generally Cooke, supra note 112 (analyzing the shift in balance of power from the
military commanders to the judges and lawyers).
297
See Part IV, supra.
298
See Part V, supra.
294
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But the question remains. What is the primary purpose of the
military justice system? The answer lies in part in an objective analysis
of the history and development of military justice. Historically, starting
with the Articles of War, the system was treated as a way to permit the
commander to exercise his powers to provide good order and discipline
in his unit.299 Through the decades the Articles of War were amended to
reflect concern about the extent of that power and abuses in exercising
that power. But the charter for the military justice system, if you will,
remained. The system was established and retained for the primary
purpose of discipline. The fact that Congress has placed limits on the
commander’s discretion does not change the ultimate purpose and
function of the system.
When Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, it created a unified
military justice system, which reaffirmed the commander’s power and
authority to enforce good order and discipline. For example, the
commander’s authority to impose nonjudicial punishment was
reaffirmed.300 The UCMJ included new provisions that addressed
concerns about abuse of those powers—limits which we now consider to
be due process, or justice, protections. Those provisions—though they
inured to the benefit of persons accused of crimes—did not negate or
diminish the primary purpose of military justice.
In the succeeding decades Congress has tweaked the UCMJ, for
example by providing for Supreme Court review of court-martial
convictions. But it has not in way signaled a change in the basic,
primary, purpose of the Code. The fact that some functions which were
originally assigned to a commander are now assigned to lawyers or
judges301 does not alter the primary function of military justice:
promoting good order and discipline.

299

See generally EDWARD M. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW 1 (2d ed. 1976) (“Military justice
must, of necessity, promote good order, high morale, and discipline.”); WINTHROP, supra
note 14, at 21 (noting that preamble to 1775 Articles of War stated that Articles of War
were intended for the “due order and regulating of the military”); Ferris, supra note 8, at
446 (stating the primary purpose was to regulate military conduct of servicemen). In his
treatise, Colonel Winthrop included a listing of other statutes under the heading, “Other
Statutory Enactments Relating to the Discipline of the Army.” WINTHROP, supra note 14,
at 24.
300
See Part V.E.1.e, supra.
301
See generally Cooke, supra note 112 (analyzing the shift in balance of power from the
military commanders to the judges and lawyers).
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The preamble to the current MCM incorrectly signals to the casual
reader that the first purpose of the military justice system is to provide
justice and the secondary purpose is to promote good order and
discipline.302 The order of the list of purposes is a threat to the true
primary purpose because it can be used by those espousing a stronger
justice model to justify additional limits on the commander’s powers—or
even divesting the commander of essential powers and responsibilities
needed to insure good order and discipline.
And focusing primarily on the justice component could be used to
justify transferring powers traditionally held by the commander to a
civilian prosecutor. The current military justice system reflects the
principle that the commander is responsible for fighting and winning
wars—a view expressed by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles.303 Thus, the commander should have the power to
maintain good order and discipline through the military justice system.
The commander should not have to depend on a civilian justice system to
enforce good order and discipline.304
302

MCM, supra note 17, pmbl.
350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
304
The use of civilian prosecutors was recently addressed in the Appeals Chamber
decision in Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina & Mladan Markač. Gotovina and Markač had
been tried and convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fomer
Yugoslavia. In overturning their convictions, the Appeals Chamber considered whether
Markač, as commander of the Special Police during Operation Storm in the 1990s, could
be held liable for crimes committed by them. The court observed:
303

Turning first to superior responsibility, the Appeals Chamber notes
that the Trial Chamber did not explicitly find that Markač possessed
effective control over the Special Police. The Trial Chamber noted
evidence indicative of a superior-subordinate relationship and found
that commanders of relevant Special Police units were subordinated
to Markač. However, the Trial Chamber was unclear about the
parameters of Markač’s power to discipline Special Police members,
noting that he could make requests and referrals, but that “crimes
committed by members of the Special Police fell under the
jurisdiction of State Prosecutors.”
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeal Judgment ¶ 148 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012) (citations omitted, emphasis
added). In effect, Markač was exonerated in part because he lacked the power to
discipline those under his command. He had to depend on civilian authorities to enforce
the discipline in his command. For further discussion of this decision, see Gary D. Solis,
The Gotovina Acquittal: A Sound Appellate Course Correction, 215 MIL. L. REV. 78
(2013).
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If the primary purpose and function of the military justice system is
to promote good order and discipline, then what of the “justice” or “due
process” element? The answer lies in recognizing the difference in laws
that authorize or grant powers, and those that serve as limitations on the
exercise of that power. The thrust of the Code—as of the Articles of
War—is to recognize the commander’s authority to exercise good order
and discipline. Provisions in the Code, the MCM, service regulations,
and case law provide checks on the commander’s exercise of that
authority. But those “justice” checks do not change the primary purpose
and function of the system.
VII. Conclusion and Recommendations
Applied together, the thematic approach, the models approach, and
the primary purpose approach summarize the relationship between the
“discipline” and “justice” elements as follows:


First, the primary purpose of the military justice system is to
enable commanders to enforce good order and discipline in
their units.



Second, the military justice system imposes due process
protections on the exercise of those powers by the
commander, the prosecutor, the court-martial, and the
appellate courts reviewing a court-martial.



Third, the due process limitations—although critical to any
criminal justice system—must not overwhelm the primary
purpose of military justice.

Using those principles, I offer two recommendations for addressing
the conundrum: First, developing a template to apply the foregoing
principles and second, amending the UCMJ and the MCM to reflect those
principles.
The tensions evident in the conundrum will appear any time there is
a proposal to amend the UCMJ or the MCM. In finding the right balance
and combination of the two elements, the policy makers and those
charged with considering changes or amendments to the military justice
system must follow some sort of principled template. A helpful starting
point in looking for a principled template is the approach the Supreme
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Court used in deciding how much procedural due process is due to a
person who is threatened with a deprivation of life, liberty or property. In
Matthews v. Eldridge,305 the Court provided a three-pronged balancing
test:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through procedures used,
and the probative value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved,
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirements would
entail.306
In United States v. Weiss,307 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the military accused had been denied due process because the
military judge did not have a fixed term of office. The accused argued
that the Court should apply the three-pronged Matthews test. The
government argued that the Court should apply the test adopted by the
Court in Medina v. United States.308 The Court rejected both arguments,
stating that those tests were inapplicable in the military context. The test,
said the Court, was set out in Middendorf v. Henry309: The question is
whether the factors militating in favor of a particular right are so
extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by
Congress.310

305

424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Id. at 335.
307
510 U.S. 163 (1994).
308
505 U.S. 437 (1992). In Medina, the defendant had argued that the Court should apply
the Matthews test in the context of a challenge to a state procedural law which placed the
burden of showing incompetency on the defendant. The Court said that the Matthews test
should be limited to civil cases and that the appropriate test for criminal cases was
whether “the [rule in question] offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id. at 445. The
Court noted that the Bill of Rights provide explicit guidance for criminal procedure rules
and that expansion of those guarantees under the Due Process Clause would “invite
undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance
that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order.” Id. at 443. The Court assumed
that the states would decide how best to adjust their procedural rules.
309
425 U.S. 25 (1976).
310
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177.
306
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This approach, however, assumes that Congress has applied some
sort of test or template in crafting the UCMJ and in considering any
subsequent amendments. Thus, the Court left to Congress the task of
addressing the conundrum and deciding how to balance the military’s
interest in good order and discipline and the rights of a servicemember to
due process of law. Congress, in Article 36 of the UCMJ, authorized the
President to formulate policies and procedures for implementing the
UCMJ. In considering changes to the military justice system the policy
makers—whether in Congress, the White House, or in the Department of
Defense—should consider the following questions.

311



First, what military interests, e.g., good order and
discipline, will be furthered by the provision in the
UCMJ, the Manual, or the regulation?311



Second, what benefits, if any, will the provision provide
to the servicemember?312



Third, what burdens, if any, will the provision place on
the military justice system?313

The attention of those suggesting reforms or changes almost always focuses on
expanding the rights of an accused. But in reality, there have been changes to the UCMJ
over the years that recognized the need of commanders to maintain good order and
discipline by expanding jurisdiction, see Part V.E.1.b, supra. The same is true for
changes to the MCM. For example, the Military Justice Act of 1983 and the 1984 version
of the Manual simplified greatly the requirements for preparing legal post-trial
recommendations. Those reviews could properly be included in those features of the
military justice system that protected the accused; but they consumed a great deal of time
and were a constant source of problems, which resulted in many courts-martial records
being returned to the trial level for corrective action. See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, §
17-8(B)(2), at 1117 (discussing problems with post-trial recommendations). The process
was further streamlined in 2008 and 2010. Id. at 1120–21.
312
This, in effect, is the flip side of the cost factor, listed above. Consider the example of
the changes in the MCM that resulted in greatly simplifying of post-trial
recommendations. Arguably, the accused lost a chance to challenge the technical failures
in the recommendation, but the government was able to reduce the amount of time and
resources in preparing what had become a very complicated and detailed report.
313
For example, in 2009, the Cox Commission recommended that all general and special
courts-martial be reviewable by the service appellate courts, regardless of the sentence
adjudged and that a servicemember could seek review at the Supreme Court, even if the
Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces did not hear the case. NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY
JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE COMM., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION OF THE AM. BAR
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MILITARY JUSTICE (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.128855.1292429643!/menu/standard/file/coxreport
.pdf. Those changes would certainly expand the due process rights of an accused. But it
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This model roughly approximates the Matthews v. Eldridge test.
Although the Supreme Court has said that this test was inapplicable to its
review of military justice provisions, it should still remain useful to those
charged with considering changes to the military justice system.314
Addressing these questions helps frame the policymaker’s approach to
the conundrum—keeping in mind that the primary function of the
military justice system is to promote good order and discipline.
With regard to the second recommendation—to amend the UCMJ
and the MCM to reflect the three principles stated above—Congress
should add a clear statement of purpose to the Code. It could be included
in Article 1 and generally follow the form used in the preamble to the
MCM.
In that regard, the Preamble to the MCM should be amended to put
good order and discipline in first place, as the true primary purpose of
military justice, but also recognize the need to provide due process of
law to those accused of committing offenses in the Armed Forces:
The purpose of military law is to assist in maintaining
good order and discipline in the armed forces, to provide
due process of law, to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby
to strengthen the national security of the United
States.315
Changing the preamble and including similar language in the UCMJ
would be a step in the right direction. In doing so, Congress and the
President have an opportunity to resolve the military justice conundrum.

would result in additional costs of time, personnel, and financial resources. Given the
Supreme Court’s record of granting full review in very few cases each year, those costs
would be difficult to justify. The accused would still be able to seek collateral relief in the
federal courts.
314
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992) (O’Connor, J, concurring) (noting that
“the balancing of equities that Mathews v. Eldridge outlines remains a useful guide in due
process cases”.
315
This proposal uses the term “due process” of law. Although the term can be
ambiguous, it is preferable to the more ambiguous term, “justice.”

